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Attacks against mobile systems have escalated over the past decade.  There have been 
increases of fraud, platform attacks, and malware.  The Internet of Things (IoT) offers a 
new attack vector for Cybercriminals.  M2M contributes to the growing number of 
devices that use wireless systems for Internet connection.  As new applications and 
platforms are created, old vulnerabilities are transferred to next-generation systems. 
There is a research gap that exists between the current approaches for security framework 
development and the understanding of how these new technologies are different and how 
they are similar.  This gap exists because system designers, security architects, and users 
are not fully aware of security risks and how next-generation devices can jeopardize 
safety and personal privacy.  Current techniques, for developing security requirements, 
do not adequately consider the use of new technologies, and this weakens 
countermeasure implementations.  These techniques rely on security frameworks for 
requirements development.  These frameworks lack a method for identifying next 
generation security concerns and processes for comparing, contrasting and evaluating 
non-human device security protections.  This research presents a solution for this 
problem by offering a novel security framework that is focused on the study of the 
“functions and capabilities” of M2M devices and improves the systems development life 
cycle for the overall IoT ecosystem.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Background 
Ecosystems take various forms, including social ecosystems, software ecosystems, 
and technological ecosystems.  According to Jiang and ShiWei (2010), these systems are 
made up of units consisting of various parts and factors that work together to contribute 
knowledge, make connections, and follow behaviors to form a community.  In recent 
years, the research community focused on emerging technologies that make up the 
Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystem.   
The Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystem is often labeled by one of the following 
industry buzzwords, the Machine-to-Machine (M2M) ecosystem, the Industrial Internet, 
or the Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) ecosystem.  However, industry buzzwords lead to 
confusion (Casson & Della Giusta, 2014).  In the literature, these terms are sometimes 
used interchangeably, while at other times they are used to describe distinct concepts 
(Conti, 2006; Atzori, Iera, & Morabito, 2010; Severi et al., 2014).  The Internet of Things 
is the more predominant, broader concept describing where the physical world merges 
with the digital world.  
IoT evolved from M2M and other technologies including the Cellular Networks, 
Location Based Services and the supervisory control and data acquisition system 
(SACDA).  The IoT is an idea, an architectural framework for where all things are 
connected over a network.  The M2M ecosystem is where the machines communicate 
with other physical machines as connected and networked devices within the IoT.  These 
machines as devices, are a collection of sensors, smart switches, meters, network 
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gateways, and controllers that are connected together to collect information and transfer 
that information to a processing point, with little to no human user interaction (Chui, 
Loffler, & Roberts, 2010).  The focus of this research is on the devices that make up the 
M2M ecosystem.   
As explained by Wu et al., (2011), M2M ecosystems can be found in many 
domains, such as consumer services (smart home technologies, consumer electronics, 
connected car, etc.), manufacturing, healthcare, energy (smart metering and grids), and 
transportation (asset tracking and vehicle to vehicle communications).  In all, there are 16 
critical national infrastructure domains as defined by the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (Vugrin, Warren, Ehlen, & Camphouse, 2010).   
The recent growth of M2M attributed to several compounding factors, including 
global Internet reach, growth and expansion of mobile networks, the growing maturity of 
ipv6 and the capillary architecture of meshed networks (Marcovici, 2014).  Other key 
factors have been the rapid evolution of smartphones, tablets, and supporting 
technologies, along with the dropping prices of sensors, actuators, and processors.  
Technology leaders and research firms such as Cisco, Machina Research, ABI Research, 
and IBM estimate that the future M2M/IoT connected embedded node-base will number 
upwards of 50 billion devices within the next 5 to 7 years (Murar & Brad, 2014).  Some 
forecasts estimate more than one trillion devices will be connected by 2025.   
It is believed that the M2M ecosystem will evolve through three distinct stages.  
Stage one involves getting more devices onto the network.  Stage one is where we are 
today.  Stage two is true automation among devices without human interventions.  Stage 
three is “building applications on top of connected devices,” so that things interact and 
3 
 
 
are tied together seamlessly (Chang, 2014; Latvakoski et al., 2014).  Researchers expect 
that M2M ecosystems will track and interact with all aspects of life in the future.  As a 
result of the evolution of M2M, its pervasive nature, the convergence of physical and 
cyber worlds, and the implications of devices taking action without human intervention, 
M2M security is critical to safeguard our national security as much as our personal 
security (Rubin, Lynch, Escaravage, & Lerner, 2014).   
Understanding Machine to Machine 
Machine to Machine or (M2M) is a term that refers to computing devices (sensors, 
actuators, and gateways) that are interconnected, communicate with each other, supply 
information to upstream systems, and have the capability to collaborate and act in the 
physical world, primarily without human intervention (Boswarthick, Elloumi, & Hersent, 
2012).  As M2M ecosystems are deployed within various domains, there will be a natural 
evolution for these domains to interact with each other.  For example, a connected car 
system may interact with a smart home system to trigger events within the home as the 
car pulls into the driveway.  The growth of wireless networks, as well as the rise of 
smartphones, tablets, and supporting technology, will continue to fuel the growth of 
devices in the wireless domain.  However, most M2M communications ecosystems will 
include a mix of both wired and wireless communication mechanisms and a cluster of 
Meshed capillary local networks and worldwide reaching long-range networks.  
M2M Service Categories 
M2M is divided into two service categories: Finished services and Ad-hoc services. 
A service provider manages “Finished” services from end-to-end over secured transport 
mechanisms that may or may not be dedicated to the service (Kim, Wei, & Lee, n.d.). 
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Ad-hoc services, on the other hand, are not formally supported by the provider and are 
supported by an individual entity, such as a consumer, small business, or open 
community, and are run over the open Internet (Niyato, Xiao, & Wang, 2011).  Due to 
lack of centralized management, monitoring, and processes in-place, ad-hoc services 
provide greater security risks.   
M2M Ecosystem Samples 
There are many types of M2M ecosystems that span a multitude of industry 
verticals, including energy, manufacturing, consumers, and transportation.  Some 
examples of prevalent M2M ecosystems that illustrate the pervasive nature of its 
application include the following. 
 Connected car: GM OnStar was one of the first applications to use basic voice 
support services and vehicular troubleshooting.  It evolved with new services, 
such as anti-theft remote engine kill and more sophisticated diagnostics.  It is now 
possible to use smart phones to access the car to check the battery life and locate 
or unlock the car; entertainment packages are being added as well.  In the future, 
cars will communicate with other cars and traffic control centers for collision 
avoidance and congestion control.  The concept of driverless cars is also fast 
becoming a reality (Chan, 2011). 
 Healthcare: Kim et al., (n.d.) explains that M2M technology has a major impact 
on the healthcare sector; M2M applications are already in use in hospitals and 
medical facilities and by individual healthcare professionals.  Additional verticals 
include remote patient monitoring, functionality, maintenance system controls, 
and patient records storage.  Connected devices monitor a patient’s condition 
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worldwide, so that a radiologist in New York can view and diagnose a patient’s 
broken leg in the French Alps and interact remotely with other doctors.  Medical 
equipment with sensors for Smart IVs, monitor and change medicine dosage for a 
patient, which automatically helps nurses and doctors to provide better patient 
care.  Electronic records are updated in real-time, providing caregivers with up-to-
date treatment information. 
 Wearable devices: Wearable devices for real-time tracking of the vital signs of 
self-trackers and medical providers are already available in the market.  The next 
invention is likely to be subcutaneous sensors; any of these devices could easily 
network with medical devices such as insulin pumps and pacemakers (Seong, 
Lee, & Kang, 2014). 
 Smart Grid: The smart grid technology streamlines energy production and 
distribution.  For example, connected devices in a house are networked with 
neighborhood hubs that perform centralized processing to manage the local 
energy use, to reduce usage, to power storage requirements, and to provide real- 
time availability updates (Sharma & Akhouri, 2014).  Intelligence is added to 
devices that plug into the grid.  This allows the electrical grid to anticipate 
potential supply and distribution issues.  Working in concert with smart devices 
and smart meters, the smart grid can automatically coordinate electrical usage and 
notify devices to reduce consumption or perform tasks after peak loads subside 
(López, Moura, Moreno, & Camacho, 2014).   
 Smart infrastructure and cities: Sensors added to roadways, bridges, buildings, 
and transmission towers provide regular updates concerning the state of use and 
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wear and tear on these structures, thus allowing for maintenance planning and 
usage control.  While humans using sensor data in a traffic control center today 
manage traffic flow, the natural evolution will be smart roads and bridges that 
communicate with smart traffic control devices to control traffic flow 
automatically (Elmangoush, Steinke, Al-Hezm, & Magedanz, 2014). 
 Smart home: Consumers have begun to automate day-to-day experiences within 
the home.  Many electric and electronic appliances can now be wired or 
connected wirelessly to a central control system and gateway.  These control 
systems provide the homeowner with the ability to manage various devices such 
as alarm clocks, coffee makers and even the toaster.  Automation includes 
window shades that rise on command and thermostats that set temperature based 
on the occupant’s movement.  Home security already leverages M2M; networks 
of sensors and devices take action based on owner-defined rules.  Homeowners 
use mobile phones to control electronic home appliances and utilities by applying 
intelligence techniques.  These intelligent things learn to connect and 
communicate without human interaction (Hosek, et al., 2014).  This is rapidly 
evolving to automated tasks or notifications that occur when the user is outside of 
the home.  For example, if you rush out of your home late for work, you might 
receive a message on your smartphone that you left the doors unlocked.  You 
could take an action remotely to lock the doors and arm the alarm system. 
 Asset and cargo tracking: Knowing the real-time location of goods is critical for 
many industries.  Small M2M devices such as RFID tags and GPS modules can 
be attached to assets and cargo containers to allow suppliers, shippers, and owners 
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to track their high-value assets across multiple transportation methods, including 
the shipping containers and even the cargo bay of an aircraft.  M2M devices can 
be attached to a high value asset that enables the end user to track the location of 
the asset.  According to Jordan (2014), automated shipping ports will use 
container attached M2M devices to track the location of containers, load 
containers on the appropriate ships and trucks, and automatically redirect 
containers based on customer needs.  In addition, asset tracking supports 
inventory controls.  For example, field equipment such as tractors and mowers are 
monitored for location and condition.  Two mowers placed along the highway 
communicate with each other to avoid overlapping coverage and collision 
hazards.  For shipping, M2M devices, combined with GPS location, enables 
updated condition notices, such as refrigerated van temperature.  For inventory 
and vending machine, product expiration, service and maintenance needs are 
transferred to the distribution center and orders are automatically filled (Jordan, 
2014). 
Conclusion  
M2M ecosystems will continue to evolve from reporting and telematics to a state 
where collaboration between devices, as well as between M2M ecosystems, will create 
actions in the physical world that occurs without human intervention.  There will be 
billions of connected devices into which we may or may not have visibility and these 
systems and devices will be taking on greater and greater responsibilities which will have 
a significant human impact based on their proper operation.  Because of this, it is critical 
that a sound security methodology is applied to secure the overall IoT Ecosystem. 
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Problem Statement 
The M2M ecosystem is not secured by present information security policy (Lake, 
Milito, Morrow, & Vargheese, 2014).  A research gap is present where current security 
frameworks fail to address needed protections for next generation systems like M2M. 
Present frameworks do not adequately consider next-generation threats from a system or 
device that is non-human driven, which weakens countermeasure implementations and 
security guideline development (Wash, 2010).  There is a lack of sufficient research on 
the intersection of human interface, wireless, and M2M device risks and security 
countermeasures (Riahi, et al., 2014).  Presently, security for M2M is based on current 
mobile systems’ security frameworks.  It is unknown how these frameworks will measure 
up against emerging threats, unknown vulnerabilities, and new devices in an automated 
and self-reacting system like M2M (Ennesser, 2012).   
 
Dissertation Goal 
The goal of this research was to develop a framework that evaluates Machine-to-
Machine (M2M) device security.  The purpose was to seek out and solve the stated 
problem by developing a novel security framework that is focused on validating the study 
of the “functions” of M2M devices, based on the tested “capabilities” of such devices and 
then improve the development life cycle processes in the M2M ecosystem. This effort (a) 
adequately considered restrictions and constraints; (b) identified significant shortfalls; 
and (c) led to a more thorough and detailed M2M Security Framework.  Other existing 
methodologies do not provide a representation of what or which M2M system 
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components should be secured based on the function they perform (Godfrey et al., 2015).  
A framework approach that identifies devices, components, and functions that are harmed 
when left vulnerable helps to direct ecosystem-design principles and generates better 
security recommendations (Molotsi & Tait, 2013).  Weaknesses in any security 
framework, or the lack of such a framework, threatens the overall protection of the 
system, because these jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the 
endpoint device; where the system is most exposed.   
This research identified and defined the framework’s security controls, which 
then offers possible improvements to authentication, authorization, data confidentiality, 
integrity, accountability, session management, and transport security in order to mitigate 
risk.  Without sufficient knowledge of these controls, the functional requirements that are 
created out of the framework will not satisfy architectural principles and good security 
practice standards (Godfrey et al., 2015).   
This goal was reached by first building a test platform that includes three M2M 
devices connected to a device-management system for command and control.  System’s 
development, research and testing was completed by modifying, adapting, and applying 
testing techniques as described by the Open Web Application Security Project, Mobile 
Security and OWASP Internet of Things Top 10 Projects (OWASP, 2014).  Although the 
OWASP project is dedicated to web application security, all testing methods effectively 
offer guidelines for evaluating the security of computer systems and networks.  Utilizing 
these methods led to the validation and verification of the effectiveness of a security 
framework for M2M and the development of a new, comprehensive M2M security 
framework that addresses the uniqueness of this technology.   
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Relevance and Significance 
The Internet of Things (IoT) running M2M devices is completely changing 
today’s computing environment (Chen, 2013).  IoT is best described as the connection of 
people to people, people to machines, and machines to machines, or as the idea of all 
objects connected to the Internet (Tan & Wang, 2010).  M2M devices are the hardware 
device component sub-section of IoT and a collection of sensors, smart devices, network 
nodes, and controllers that are connected together to collect information and transfer that 
information to a processing point with little to no human user interaction (Chui, Loffler, 
& Roberts, 2010).  Chen explains that these sensors can listen and talk in ways that 
humans cannot.  It is believed that M2M will improve human life by helping to save 
money, forecast weather, predict events, and will provide an overall safer environment 
(Chen, 2012).  However, there is a lack of study about the effects on security and privacy 
of humans not monitoring, controlling, maintaining, or policing the ecosystem (Dahl & 
Holbo, 2012).   
Many mobility trends today lack properly designed security and privacy 
requirements. For example, Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) and the push to move 
security responsibility to the end user are exposing new issues for security and privacy 
(Armando, Costa, & Merlo, 2013).  According to Armando et al. (2013), corporations are 
finding that security policies geared toward traditional desktop protections are antiquated 
and ineffective.  A modernized approach is needed to protect the swiftly moving 
workforce from the environments offering information anywhere, at any time, and with 
any device (Lu, et al., 2011).  If the exchange of information or content is unprotected, 
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confidentiality and privacy are lost.  Next-generation devices, such as those used in 
M2M, will help control connected environments and will provide a link to mobile 
systems, smart cities, and various sensor networks; therefore, the people using these 
platforms must protect all the information thereon (Kriesten, Tünnermann, Mertes, & 
Hermann, 2010).  Enterprise IT policies protect corporate information only if the users 
abide by the rules set in place (Harris, 2009).  With the increase of attacks on personal 
mobile devices, companies have experienced an increased loss of protected data and 
compromise of company networks.  These same vulnerabilities threaten the M2M 
ecosystem. 
According to Constantinos, Coursaris, and Kim (2011), all mobile environments 
lack an effective way to understand how the user will implement various applications.  
The researchers state that present mobility requirement frameworks lack functional tasks 
understandings and how capabilities drive the ability to protect.  This lack allows 
malicious users to subvert existing requirements and presents designs that cannot change 
when the user defines a new way to apply the technology.  Conventional requirements 
inadequately design mobile interfaces and applications to fit particular contextual 
settings, and are not flexible (Constantinos, et al., 2011).  Requirements of the 
engineering process in M2M fail because there is no consideration of activities taking 
place for the development of threatening scenarios.  Therefore, risk management and 
applied testing processes should be incorporated into security frameworks for devices in 
ecosystems such as M2M (Caruso & Masters, 2014).  This study exposes the failing 
points of present techniques by identifying specific task failures and proves that a new 
approach is more effective.  It explores the device from the view of dynamic factors to 
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reveal how this impact usability may contribute to effective security design, as 
recommended by Constantinos, et al., (2011).   
Wireless carriers force robust security wrappers around devices in order to 
address the lack of protected access, at the risk of violating the privacy of the owner of 
the device (Enck et al., 2014).  These solutions put the network operator in control of the 
user owned devices; the operator has access to the device, to personal user data, to user 
location, and to specific networks and applications.  Once on the network, the device’s 
policy and provisioning capabilities are subject to security automation (Enck et al., 2014).   
Wireless system security is complex.  Identifying behavioral patterns reduces the 
complexity and exposes common functions, which leads to more effective requirements 
and reusable design practices.  However, in M2M, the access to the device, user personal 
data, user location, and even specific networks and applications is automated and hidden. 
User side protections are limited, and thus security frameworks are limited (Saedy & 
Mojtahed, 2011).  IoT and M2M communications make information available through 
crowd and information base; this calls for a shift toward information controls beyond 
network policy in order to protect the unaware benefactor (TalebiFard, Nicanfar, Hu, & 
Leung, 2013).   
 
Barriers and Issues 
In order to successfully complete this research, the study had to ensure that the 
new framework proved to be a value-added process for users and ecosystem owners.  The 
Internet of Things (IoT) is a concept where physical objects all connect to the Internet.  
Because M2M devices are the physical part of the IoT, one framework does not 
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guarantee that all objects are secure.  This barrier required that we narrowed the quickly 
changing environment down to one specific “thing”, such as a set of devices performing a 
specific “task”.  To mitigate this challenge, the study focused on three prototyped M2M 
devices that fulfilled the specific tasks and function, such as location and device control 
required by the driving use cases.  For each task, security controls were tested, changed 
and analyzed, depending on the failure or success of the increased control.  These efforts 
led to the final framework development and validation.     
 
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
 A limitation of this study was that the M2M ecosystem use cases did not clearly 
defined the required security requirements required by the business logic.  Also, the 
insufficient research did not address how tiny machines will function in various 
categories and environments.  Several delimitations exist regarding the scope of the 
review and test platform. M2M devices change quickly and commercial devices are 
limited and untested, the prototyped devices required alteration to comply with the 
Command and Control Center and testing tools are limited and mostly available for only 
smartphone evaluation.  In addition, all testing was “feasibility” in nature and sought out 
possible attack points as defined by past research and executed attack scenarios.  
 
Definition of Terms 
Autonomic computing.  Is where devices and systems are operating in a self-managing 
computing model. 
Actuator.  Is a device that performs action and output.  
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Application. Is typically software that is designed to perform specific task for a desired 
outcome.   
Capability. Is where the ability to do something is recognized and determined.  
Controller. Is an object that controls actuators.  
Device. Is any embedded electronic computing equipment that collects data for 
actuators and sensors for communications.  
Function. Is where the purpose or activity for which a thing exists and is used is 
recorded. 
Gateway.  Is equipment with electronic computing and communication capability is 
used for transferring information within networks.  
Internet of Things (IoT).  An idea where objects, animals or people are seen as unique 
identifiers connected together over a network. 
Machine to Machine (M2M).  Is the concept and systems design where devices 
communicate to each other without requiring human-to-human or human-to-computer 
interaction. 
M2M sensor.  Is the device that detects and responds to specific inputs such as motion, 
moisture and pressure. 
M2M Service Provider. Is an entity, such as a company, that provides network 
connectivity.  
M2M Ecosystem. Is an area network that provides connectivity between M2M devices.  
M2M Communications Network. Is the physical telecommunications used to exchange 
data between entities, such as devices, gateways and network infrastructures.  
15 
 
 
RFID (radio frequency identification).  Is a technology and devices that uses 
electromagnetic radio frequency (RF) to output the identity of an object, animal, or 
person.  
Secured Environment. Is where enabling secure execution of functions is place in an 
ecosystem  
Smart Grid.  Is a generic label for the electricity distribution system. 
Thing. Is simply an identifiable element located in an environment that is connected to 
other things for the purpose of intelligence transfer.  
Use Case. Is a model that describes a system function from the point of view an actor.  
 
List of Acronyms 
Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) 
Global Positioning System (GPS) 
Internet of Things (IoT) 
Intrusion detection systems (IDS). 
Machine-to-Machine (M2M)  
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
Wireless sensor networks (WSN)  
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Summary 
This chapter provides an introduction and overview of the current operational M2M 
ecosystems.  It presents the technical definition of the IoT, and then introduces the M2M 
security problem that needed to be addressed at the time of this research.  Also, described 
are the innovation and novelty of M2M devices; these platforms and applications call for 
unique security requirements and design.  The chapter summarizes some of the 
challenges of M2M security and gaps in the literature.  At its end, the chapter introduces 
the goal of the research preformed to develop a framework that evaluates Machine-to-
Machine device security. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
 
Introduction  
Machine-to-Machine (M2M) devices are comprised of inexpensive sensors that are 
deployed across many different domains.  These include smart power grids, vehicular 
telematics, information management, medical and health services, and smart home 
networks (Poncela, Moreno, & Aamir, 2014).  Because M2M devices will eventually be 
included in all objects, including books, televisions, bikes, cars, and homes, the large 
amount of data is a security risk in itself (Shafiq, et al., 2013).  The data collected is 
stored in unknown locations within the cloud and can disclose information about 
individuals, such as buying pattern, locations, communication activities, and even health 
data.  M2M device costs fall in the region of $1 to $200.  They have a wide range of 
applications for different industry sectors, which makes them an inexpensive option for 
business technologies.  M2M devices are unsupervised and placed in a variety of 
locations, which provides hackers access to individual devices and exposes them to theft, 
reuse, and fraud (Chen & Ma, 2014).  As the M2M market grows, researchers expect that 
the number of fraudulent uses of these devices will grow.   
Mobile devices such as smartphones, tablets, sensors, and laptop computers have 
become tools for everyday life.  However, because users of these devices are not fully 
aware of security risks, the devices are used in ways that may jeopardize the user’s safety 
and personal privacy (Kanuparthi, Karri, & Addepalli, 2013).  Attacks against mobile 
devices have escalated due to an increase of fraud, development of malware specific to 
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mobile devices, and the heightened interest of cyber-crooks (Murynets & Piqueras Jover, 
2012).  Mobile devices are full of sensitive information about users and the companies 
that employs them; this vital intelligence can be used to gain access to internal business 
and personal networks and systems (McAfee, 2011).  Mobile devices are no longer just 
targets for low-level hackers, but are also the targets of criminals seeking to steal 
personal and business communications and data (Murphy & Murphy, 2013).  M2M 
networks and devices have little or no user interaction, but the same vulnerabilities will 
threaten these systems (Kim, He, Thottan, & Deshpande, 2014). 
The fundamental premise of this shift in technology is not only to integrate data for 
greater efficiency, but also to develop the means by which to link goods and services to 
consumers and users in strategic marketing and engagement (Atzori, Iera, & Morabito, 
2010).  Despite this fundamental premise, there are many additional facets to the purpose 
of M2M.  In essence, the process breaks down the barriers between digital and physical 
objects (Kortuem et al., 2010).  This can allow for greater connections and efficiencies in 
the sale of such objects, in the use of educational resources, in the development of health 
care objectives, and so on (Welbourne, et al., 2009).   
At the same time, however, M2M introduces the means by which additional 
challenges may occur.  Issues of security, which is the ability of the system itself to 
remain safe for users and for organizations, and of user control, which is the ability of a 
user to have power over the user’s own identity and experience, are yet to be solved 
(Sarma & Girão, 2009).  It is evident that not all of the infrastructures for M2M systems 
have been perfected to the point at which people know, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that 
their private information is being protected.  It is clear that IoT ecosystem and all of the 
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new technological tools that they present create issues for both business and personal 
consumers when it comes to privacy.  This literature review outlines the present 
challenges for M2M systems within the context of smartphone technology.  Because 
smartphones share security protocols and networks with the M2M ecosystem, it is 
important to draw on the smartphone literature and its application to newer M2M 
technologies that have not been investigated as deeply in the existing research.  The 
literature review thus provides an assessment of current challenges within the M2M 
security framework and examines the solutions proposed by the literature and concludes 
with an assessment and summary of the literature. 
 
A Definition of Security Frameworks 
A security framework is a more comprehensive form of an information system’s 
framework model.  According to Alqassem (2014), these models ensure security by 
examining vulnerabilities and eliminating risk.  A complete security framework includes 
several essential elements in terms of technological applications, people, usages, 
processes, policies, guidelines, business logic and strategies (Ohki, et al., 2009).  To be of 
value, a comprehensive security framework must include:  
• Proper practices and execution of policies, 
• Sound controls of people, processes, and technologies,  
• Analysis of risk,  
• Acceptable options or alternatives,  
• Have an implementation guide,  
• Provide a method to test compliance against the framework. (Alqassem, 2014)  
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According to Laya, Alonso, and Alonso-Zarate (2014), the overall body of research 
on M2M security is not comprehensive; in fact, it is fragmented and largely separated 
into the different critical infrastructure sectors, as defined by the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (Evans, Hammond, & Shamsuddin, 2014). Work has been 
accomplished within these sectors, for example, on the communications and security 
protocols for wireless networks, smart grids, smart home monitoring systems, and health 
care systems (Laya, Alonso, & Alonso-Zarate, 2014; Joshi et al., 2014; Park, et al., 
2014). 
M2M ecosystems are pervasive in nature and found across many domains (energy 
sectors, manufacturing, agriculture, vehicular telematics, information management, 
medical and health services, smart homes, etc.).  They allow for inter-domain 
communication and capillary networking for federation. Federation takes place when 
M2M engages in system-to-system collaboration and interfaces together (Lee, Lee, & 
Rhee, 2014). These systems and their various components interact with each other and 
perform functions on behalf of humans in the virtual and physical world.  As explained 
by Godfrey et al. (2015), these automated functions and the potential impact of their 
manipulation or disruption drive the need for new processes and the evolution of security 
technology in M2M, in terms of device identity management, security capabilities for low 
powered devices and security visibility tools.  To this end, the literature review places a 
significant focus on understanding the gaps in the literature and drawing connections 
between current M2M protocols and best practices in related technologies such as 
Cellular Network Devices. 
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M2M Devices and Smartphone Technology  
 It is important to understand the differences between machine-to-human and 
machine-to-machine devices because the devices have parallel security concerns.  A 
greater depth of research has taken place in machine-to-human technology than in 
machine-to-machine technology, so it is to our benefit to understand the extent to which 
machine-to-human research can be applied to security issues of M2M devices.   
M2M devices use the same wireless communications networks as smartphones, but 
also make use of short-range networks and gateways for peer-to-peer messaging.  To this 
end, the development and end-user issues that impact smartphone technology and 
security also impact M2M device protocols (Gyrard, Bonnet, & Boudaoud, 2014; 
Poncela, Moreno, & Aamir, 2014). 
According to Zhang et al. (2011), smartphones are machine-to-human interface 
devices that provide input for communication and applications function.  Machine-to-
machine devices, on the other hand, are small and inexpensive, and they are designed for 
automated (rather than human-centered) wired or wireless communications.  Both 
devices rely on the same networks for communications, but M2M devices may offer 
greater security concerns with respect to confidentiality, integrity, and availability due to 
bandwidth restraint, authentication, access control limits, and the need for secure 
identification certificates (Vandikas, et al., 2011; Kim & Hong, 2014).  Nonetheless, 
M2M deployed devices will outnumber smartphones within the next decade (Cruz, 
Duarte, & Ferreira, 2014).  In 2012, there were one billion smartphone users worldwide; 
by the end of 2015, this number will reach 1.75 billion and, by the end of 2020, the 
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number of connected M2M devices will potentially reach 50 billion (Cruz, Duarte, & 
Ferreira, 2014).   
While smartphones have specific usage and characteristics from a user behavioral 
perspective (Welsh, Baird, Zhao, & Block-Schachter, 2014), M2M devices are designed 
for specific tasks and industry functions (Poncela, Moreno, & Aamir, 2014).  However, 
according to Gyrard, Bonnet, and Boudaoud (2014), many M2M devices currently use 
2G and 3G embedded modules, which lead to old and new vulnerabilities and security 
challenges that require new security mechanisms for countermeasures.  Given these 
factors, researchers have proposed various changes to authentication in order to offer 
built-in authentication and security for easier deployment and network optimization 
(Hersent, Boswarthick, & Elloumi, 2012; Xu, Liu, Huang, & Zhang, 2014).  However, 
these changes are untested and not standardized.  
Although smartphones are capable of more complex tasks than most M2M devices, 
the functionality of the two types of devices is basically the same.  Both are attractive 
targets for attackers (Aucinas, Crowcroft, & Hui, 2012).  Both types of devices can be 
affected by data integrity issues and, therefore, require data protection assurance 
(McGrath & Scanaill, 2013).  Smartphones hold user privacy-data and M2M devices 
transport this same data.   
For example, smartphone global positioning system (GPS) networks are not only 
tied to standalone applications, but are also increasingly tied to social media services 
(Scipioni & Langheinrich, 2010).  The location-based software on a consumer’s phone 
may be engaged in collecting and publishing location information whether or not the 
consumer is actually aware of these processes, and this data can be linked to smart city 
23 
 
 
M2M devices as well (Scipioni & Langheinrich, 2010).  GPS data can then be used to 
stamp location information onto digital photographs in order to profile tourists as they 
travel, which leads to a privacy violation in the examining of the user’s movements 
throughout a city (Gasson, et al., 2011).   
Information security best practices provide classification to the data for applying 
security controls to smartphones and the wireless network elements over which the 
devices function (Kazmi, Felguera, Vila, & Marcos, 2012).  In the M2M ecosystem, on 
the other hand, automated decisions and business logic create the rules on data transport, 
which requires the implementation of higher levels of security (Pang, et al., 2013).   
 
Specific Threats to M2M Devices Predicated by Smartphone Challenges  
There is evidence that M2M devices have similar areas of vulnerability to 
smartphones devices in terms of data security.  As Christiansen (2011) explains, the 
different forms of mobile data are collected and used by corporations in the following 
three ways.     
1.  Collect personal data and aggregate it to sell to third parties, use it internally, 
or both. 
2.  Collect personal data, keeping personal data within the company but 
providing the opportunity for advertisers to specify a certain range of traits for 
target marketing.   
3.  Collect personal data with the intention of selling the information, sometimes 
including specific profiles or names, to third parties.  (p. 509) 
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Consumers may not be aware of when and the means by which this data is 
collected through smartphones and M2M devices, nor of when it might be passed on to 
third parties (Christiansen, 2011; King & Jessen, 2010; Leontiadis et al., 2012; Scipioni 
& Langheinrich, 2010; Xu et al., 2011).  This is because the majority of users do not read 
the privacy and user agreements they sign when they purchase or download software 
(Christiansen, 2011).  But, as Kiukkonen et al. (2010) explains, consumers do not 
perceive the connection between these types of information and their usage, especially in 
an M2M ecosystem where there might not be a user agreement.  M2M network owner’s 
need to become more aware of how and why consumers choose to give them access to 
their own data, and whether or not there is an actual choice taking place, especially when 
many of the data mining techniques are hidden from the consumer’s view on a daily 
basis.  All of this data is thus likely to be open to external scrutiny if the M2M or 
smartphone system is compromised. 
Security researchers have identified ways to bypass device restrictions and install 
rewritten firmware that creates malicious vulnerabilities within smartphones (Aviv, 
Gibson, Mossop, Blaze, & Smith, 2010; Park, Choi, Eom, & Chung, 2013; Karim, Shah, 
& Salleh, 2014).  If these same types of attacks were to occur within the context of a 
medical M2M device instead of within a smartphone environment, this could lead to the 
harm or even death of a hospital patient (Pérez-Cebollada, Martínez-Ruiz, & Bernal-
Agustín, 2014).  According to Pérez-Cebollada, Martínez-Ruiz, and Bernal-Agustín 
(2014), M2M devices that transport medical data are not secure because the memory of 
the devices is limited. New authentication and secure communications are required to 
protect the data and the device.  Given these factors, both the potentially critical nature of 
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the industries involved as well as the potential threats to property and human safety make 
M2M security a high priority.     
The smartphone air interface threat is also significant to M2M devices because 
evidence has shown that smartphones and wireless platforms have been attacked by a 
number of vectors that will compromise M2M devices.  Examples include: the “man-in-
the-middle” scenario, where an attacker can place a device between the target user and 
the network (Ukil, Bandyopadhyay, Bhattacharyya, & Pal, 2013); the compromising of 
authentication where an attack on the “challenge and response pairs”, the cipher keys, 
overrides the integrity keys of the authentication vector (Cheng, 2011); and 
eavesdropping, wherein the intruder listens to signaling and data connections associated 
with users and network elements without the knowledge of users (Arapinis et al., 2012).  
Also, an attacker can impersonate a user or an entire network by using false signals, user 
data, or both through the network in an attempt to make the network believe they 
originate from a “good” user. Furthermore, signals, user data, or both can be sent to a 
target user to make that user believe they originate from a genuine network (Arapinis et 
al., 2012).   
Nonetheless, the greatest threat to mobile devices comes from malware embedded 
in applications and the fact that these devices are always connected to a network 
(Distefano et al., 2010).  Mobile application development has exploded, but the capability 
of sending mobile malware to devices has exploded at the same time.  Malware has 
infected wireless-enabled devices and is capable of propagating itself to other devices, 
including M2M devices (Liu, Zhang, Yan, & Chen, 2009; Landman, 2010).  The wireless 
industry as a whole is ill-prepared to combat the problem.  According to Felt et al. 
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(2011), malware grew to epidemic proportions from 2009 to 2011.  Malware programs 
exploited all mobile operating systems, and their designs have reached a paramount level 
of sophistication.  It is unknown how quickly Malware will move in an M2M ecosystem.    
Data attacks have also been on the increase.  Over the past ten years, wireless 
devices have become more and more data-enabled.  M2M devices receive and send data, 
and access applications and information quickly (Miluzzo et al., 2010).  Xie et al. (2010) 
examined the security services that are provided at the device level and discovered that 
vendors and developers change security profiles for faster data transfer over open 
networks.  M2M devices lack security tokens but transfer valuable information and do 
not offer proper security guidelines for open wireless networks, the lack of these 
guidelines increases security and privacy concerns (Ashley, Hinton, & Vandenwauver, 
2001).  If infected with a virus, the stored information will be lost or even transferred to 
an unauthorized user.  To promote better security, a new framework approach is needed 
that supports security design at the component level and that defines best practices for 
next generation networks (Guo et al., 2013).   
Device-to-device attacks have also become more common.  Voris, Saxena, and 
Halevi (2011) explained that devices are capable of functioning as both attackers and 
victims of an attack.  Motivations for such attacks range from simple vandalism to 
information theft, mobile phone spam, and denial-of-service attacks (Goel, 2011).  In this 
form of malware, mobile bots function as propagation applications that cause excessive 
charges to customers, deteriorate services, and even cause public relations disasters 
(Nadji et al., 2011).  Chan, Venkataraman, Chaugule, and Campbell (2010) proved that 
attacks need not be complex and can serve to launch an authentication attack on the 
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operating systems that bypasses access control mechanisms and forces a restart of the 
systems.  Chan et al. (2010) described an attack that used the mobile phone as the vector 
and allowed for access to files and network connections.  Using the M2M device as a 
vector will compromise relevant public information on various platforms (Owusu, et al., 
2012).  The sheer increase of the numbers of M2M devices and their wide disbursement 
will present more opportunities for devices to be used as vectors.  The lack of security 
controls within M2M makes the ecosystem more susceptible to compromise, which could 
lead to collateral damage to the M2M ecosystem.  Federation among M2M systems, 
including capillary networks using multiple communication protocols (e.g., ZigBee, 
Bluetooth, Z-Wave and others), offers even more opportunity for compromise of 
authentication, authorization, and verification.   
According to Bahga and Madisetti (2014), the monitoring capabilities and 
processes that providers use to detect and respond to security incidents within the M2M 
ecosystem must evolve.  Today’s processes and tools for detection of M2M security 
events including present communication protocols, traffic patterns, and even the potential 
massive distributed scale of the IoT are immature. According to El-Mahdy (2014), M2M 
devices are vulnerable to the same attacks as smartphones, as well as new forms of 
security threats.  M2M platforms such as connected cars, sensors, and smart homes are 
especially susceptible to these same attacks, in addition to denial-of-services attacks and 
intrusion.  For example, the flooding attack is of great concern, according to Liu, Yang, 
and Liu (2014). In a flooding attack, a network interface is compromised by 
misconfigured end-devices, which causes an authentication signaling failure on the 
signaling and user plane of the M2M device.  Another worrisome possibility is the attack 
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of a botnet of malicious devices that attempt to flood the network (Jermyn, Salles-
Loustau, & Zonouz, 2014).  Jung, Kim, and Kim, (2014) warn that the ability to generate 
and disseminate detailed information on M2M networks facilitates the spread of malware.  
Specifically designed malware that may infect M2M devices within a group could cause 
a lack of authentication mechanisms on M2M platforms adjacent to the main device.  
These platforms include connected car or smart grid gateway sensors (Li et al., 2014).  
M2M devices are also subject to data modification and manipulation attacks against data 
(Ren, Yu, Ma, & Ren, 2013).  Modification attacks target against the integrity of routing 
messages to the prioritized devices, which causes a failure in service and can lead to harm 
or even death in the case of medical systems or connected cars (Jeon, Lee, Park, & Jeong, 
2013).  Detecting these attacks is a primary concern, especially in smart metering 
networks, where source authenticity and data integrity changes can harm the power grid 
(Abdullah, Welch, & Seah, 2013). 
In addition, communications with and authentication of a device in an M2M 
ecosystem is of utmost importance for these devices to successfully function together to 
protect against legacy attacks (Ren, Yu, Ma, & Ren, 2013).  To explain further, consider 
an M2M device endpoint that sends messages using the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), 
which falls victim to the SIP messaging attack. These attacks take advantage of known 
SIP vulnerabilities and can cause channel eavesdropping attacks, credential compromise 
attacks, function compromise attacks, and ghost compromise attacks (Ren et al., 2013).  
SIP messaging is also vulnerable to impersonation compromise attacks (Koh & Kwon, 
2014).  It is possible that if a spoofed SIP message is sent to a specific M2M device, the 
collected sensitive subscriber information will be compromised.  Also at risk in M2M is 
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theft of service itself.  This occurs in a repurposing attack, where sensors in power meters 
and devices within connected car fuel systems and compromise or services are used 
without getting charged for them (Obikoya, 2014).   
For this research, we broke down the M2M security challenges into four layers: 
data collection, communications, computing, and action (Gyrard, 2013).  Challenges 
within each of these layers include deployment, maintenance, and measurement, as well 
as the risk of failure; the complexity and number of hard-to-manage devices on M2M 
projects make the latter a particular concern (Gyrard, 2013).  For example, when a power 
company deploys a vast number of power meter reading devices to connect to homes, the 
company runs the risk of overwhelming the wireless communication networks and 
thereby threatening the security and privacy of the ecosystem (Brahmi, 2014).  Chen and 
Ma (2014) explain that M2M standards are still under development and that existing 
solutions are fragmented.  Solutions are being designed from scratch, but conventional IT 
design standards lack policy and trust. Furthermore, they do not address the challenges in 
the M2M ecosystem (Cohen, Money, & Quick, 2014).  Present application development 
tools lack the proper data analytics, data security, and sensor management needed to 
navigate the complexity within M2M ecosystems.  Different network protocols, data 
formats, incompatible devices, and multiple applications cause major security and 
privacy concerns on M2M type systems (Das, Borisov, Mittal, & Caesar, 2014) 
In M2M, the engineering of solutions that meet end user needs requires 
modernization and incorporation of end-to-end threats (Chaugule, Xu, & Zhu, 2011).  
Increasing the functionality of devices also increases the danger of attack to the 
operator’s network and the end user’s privacy and freedom of use (Sohr, Mustafa, & 
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Nowak, 2011).  Current threat management programs fail to identify threats or provide 
adequate safeguards to mobile devices (Neumann, 2009).  This practice leads to risky 
behaviors and weak security postures that do not serve to mitigate mobile security risks 
and threats.  
Security and privacy controls for mobile devices are created by mobile application 
developers, network systems engineers, and security architects, whom are likely to rely 
on lessons learned from decades of desktop protection policies (Chin et al., 2012).  
Unfortunately, this practice does not work efficiently or effectively in a self-directing 
network like M2M (Oberheide & Jahanian, 2010).  Requirements for secure coding and 
system design are unique in the M2M security (Distefano, Grillo, Lentini, & Italiano, 
2010).  
Oberheide and Jahanian (2010) explain that security and privacy are not considered 
at the design stage in mobility platforms.  This is due to the fast pace of growth within 
these platforms (Benjamins, 2014).  Mobility service providers are pushing more 
responsibility for security on to the users.  However, if the user is the device itself, as in 
M2M, this responsibility shift increases the security tensions in an already complex user 
environment, which can lead to a great misunderstanding in the differences in user 
behaviors and might possibly promote security risks (Emerging Cyber Threats Report 
2011; 2012).   
Security policy focuses on trust, information protection, and access control rules.  
These policies define the requirements that enforce security policies developed by IT 
departments using old rules (Chen, 2013).  Chen (2013) explains that these policies do 
not satisfy the challenges of and do not create suitable security policies for M2M.  
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Security systems are not effective if users’ perceived security and privacy requirements 
are not included at the design stage (Savola, 2009).  As environmental and policy changes 
take place, it becomes necessary to find a solution for detecting system behaviors and 
specification changes, especially because M2M encompasses different industries with 
many different types of devices and access technologies (Chen, 2013). 
There is a need to look deeply into the practices that govern both the use of M2M 
devices and their deployment by businesses.  According to Rodríguez, Cuéllar, Lilius, 
and Calvo-Flores (2014), human activity representation and daily human behaviors 
studies establish the criteria for the evaluation of missing features for both security and 
privacy.  According to Chen (2013), typical information security practices involve 
assessing processed data, assigning a data classification, and applying countermeasure 
security controls to network elements.  To this end, it is important to move beyond just 
the data and network element when determining security controls in M2M development, 
because it is unclear where these devices will be deployed (Chen, 2013; Rodríguez, 
Cuéllar, Lilius, & Calvo-Flores, 2014).   
Chen (2013) explains that machine-to-human interacting systems analyze incoming 
attack information in a demand attack-defense fashion.  This approach leads to only a 
partial view of the entire attack and requires great human effort to configure and deploy 
applications.  In M2M, the potentially critical nature of the industries involved and the 
potential threats to property and human safety make security a higher priority (Chen, 
2013).  When assessing the design and security controls of an M2M ecosystem, the 
potential impacts of a compromise must be analyzed and understood before one engineers 
the network and applications.  For example, a compromise at a water treatment facility 
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could result in an unsafe water supply and the loss of human life.  A compromise of a 
fleet management system of heavy equipment, on the other hand, may create problems 
for the owner of the equipment, but most likely will not endanger human life (Bojic et al., 
2012).   
 
Challenges Presented for Adequate Management Solutions  
Mobile Device Management platforms (MDM) are the default platforms for 
protecting sensitive information in the event that a smartphone is lost, stolen, or 
compromised (Redman, Girard, & Wallin, 2011).  These platforms can perform a remote 
device wipe, enhance behind-the-firewall security, and support access and control for 
thousands of users and applications (Redman et al., 2011).  In addition, the devices using 
these platforms are loaded with small applications, called clients that create enhanced on-
device security and security policy enforcement by over-the-air controls (Khan, Khan, 
Nauman, Ali, & Alam, 2009).  MDMs mitigate the privacy and security risks by 
controlling smartphone security policy through the adjustment of work and private data 
spaces and segregating of remote device management. 
According to Ebersold (2014), the M2M ecosystem is an immature and the rapidly 
changing landscape is in need of security controls.  The M2M domain remains 
uncontrolled, with distributed locations of devices and end nodes.  Because of this, the 
ecosystem is considered untrusted and lacking in security requirements; they reflect a 
limited amount of control.  Remote device management for M2M is unlike traditional 
service models, because there are many devices talking to each other and the backend 
system.  These devices perform real world actions, like locking doors and changing the 
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flight direction of an airplane in flight.  However, the mass deployment of M2M services 
is not supported efficiently by present standards. This hinders the control and 
management of many device functions (Wu, et al., 2011).   
Therefore, M2M devices are designed to function as self-monitoring devices. 
However, the traditional management techniques do not scale up to the growth of M2M 
networks and services.  According to Song, Kunz, Schmidt, and Szczytowski (2014), new 
MDM functionalities must be developed to manage and control M2M devices.  These 
functionalities include overload control, conflict management, and semantic interworking 
controls.  The systems themselves must learn personalized service recommendations and 
policy changes (Kamal et al., 2013).  Thus, in the management of traffic, adaptive radio 
resource management could reduce random access delay experienced by the device (Hsu, 
Wang, & Tseng, 2013).  It is very challenging to manage all different types of devices for 
effective communication with one another because of scalability and interoperability (that 
is, what works for one platform might not work for another) (Floeck, Papageorgiou, 
Schuelke, & Song, 2014).  M2M devices will very soon encompass a multitude of 
communication technologies and will connect to other devices and with many different 
networks.  These devices are unattended and difficult to monitor.  Lack of overall 
visibility capabilities into the M2M domain and relevant device capabilities make it 
difficult to detect when a compromise has occurred.  Thus, M2M requires a paradigm 
shift in how security is designed (Granjal, Monteiro, and Sliva, 2013).   
Chen and Chang (2012) describe the problems with M2M intrusion detection.  Few 
studies have investigated M2M specific intrusion detection systems (IDS). However, 
related work in wireless sensor networks (WSN) and mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) 
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may provide methods to identify vulnerability characteristics for M2M.  Chen and Chang 
(2012) explain that M2M hardware constraint is a challenge mostly because of the 
unreliability of wireless links between sensor and actuator nodes within the radio 
frequency spectrum in the low power radio networks.  In addition, Anggorojati, Prasad, 
and Prasad (2013) explain that it is difficult to identify the rational attacker from the 
defender in M2M ecosystems because the devices are automated. 
These known IDS techniques are not fully efficient because it is difficult to 
characterize the normal behavior of a sensor and then identify the known behavior 
patterns of non-authorized devices (Khan & Pathan, 2013).  Hammoudeh, Mancilla-
David, Selman, and Papantoni-Kazakos (2013) proposed a specification-based IDS to 
solve this problem.  The specification-based IDS is a combination solution that detects 
malicious message transmissions.  A Timing Centric IDS that identifies changes in 
timing and device response might also pose a solution (Kumar & Chilamkurti, 2014).   
In order to achieve the goal of this work, we experimented with specification-based 
intrusion detection to challenge and prove that the new security framework worked 
functionally and correctly.  As security policies changed, data was collected and analyzed 
to verify that security had increased.  This testing focused on the added value of the 
security framework, by observing when a set of resources changed and how different 
security values affected the security policy (Anggorojati, Prasad, & Prasad, 2013). 
 
Assessment of the Gaps in the Literature and Business Applications 
The findings from this literature review indicate that there is a lack of and need for 
a method for assessing the overall ecosystem security and identifying applicable security 
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controls for M2M devices.  Typical security practices involve assessing the sensitivity of 
data that is being processed, assigning a classification to the data, and applying 
appropriate security controls based on the data sensitivity (the more sensitive the data, the 
more stringent the controls).  The use of inexpensive sensors, mobile and wireless 
communications, short-range networks, and gateways as enablers to M2M systems 
present unique security challenges.   
It is evident that devices will be pervasive throughout an M2M ecosystem and will 
be performing automated functions on behalf of humans as the field of M2M technology 
develops.  If the function is manipulated or fails, the potential impacts could be wide 
ranging, depending upon the criticality of the function.  The capability to deploy security 
control on lower power devices, the lack of visibility, and the processes of device 
management are some of the evident challenges (Fischer, 2014).   
The literature demonstrates that data classification alone is insufficient to drive 
security controls and a secure design for M2M.  This is because the data by itself does not 
address the overall role of a device in an end-to-end M2M function.  For example, if one 
takes temperature data measurements singly, the information is non-critical in nature.  
However, the role of the temperature sensor in the context of an overall M2M function 
(such as temperature regulation in a home or business) determines the importance of its 
measured data.  If the temperature sensor fails to operate as intended (through 
manipulation or other means) in a home environment, consequences will be much 
different than if the same temperature sensor fails to operate as intended in a nuclear 
power plant.  Intended functions, device roles, environments, and potential impacts are 
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therefore key aspects of deriving M2M functional classification in a way that drives a 
secure design (Godfrey et al., 2015).    
Past research demonstrated the need to devise a new M2M security framework that 
is practical for use in each of the 16 national critical infrastructure sectors (Rubin, Lynch, 
Escaravage, & Lerner, 2014).  A framework that could compare, contrast, and make 
quantifiable statements about security is an extremely valuable security asset for all 
systems (Chin, Felt, Sekar, & Wagner, 2012).  Such a framework allows organizations to 
determine where resources, policies, and procedures should be placed to best secure 
present and future systems.   
The developed framework was tested against present security frameworks to justify 
the rationale for how well the new framework reaches security goals for M2M. Building 
a prototype helped obtain a more complete and thorough understanding of the system and 
framework.  However, it was difficult to compare real world systems with lab-based 
systems because there is a lack of understanding of what security really means in the 
M2M ecosystem and when the properties of this system are truly secure.  So also offered 
is a new testing approach for security in M2M that overcomes this problem in order to 
gain knowledge from the development process as defined by Alqassem, (2014).   
 
Summary  
The Machine-to-Machine ecosystem is quickly becoming a commercial offering of 
devices, networks and platforms.  The devices are tiny, unsecure components that are 
hard to command and control.  The ecosystem communicates over wireless, wire line, 
private and public networks.  M2M platforms are presently being developed for all things 
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that connect to the Internet.  This systems development effort leads to and allows the 
objects such as device and gateways to function unnoticed by humans and thereby 
expand end-user concerns about the balances between security and privacy of services, 
safety and over systems awareness.  
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 
Overview of the Research 
This research used the systems development research methodology.  This 
methodology has been a applied to systems research for over the past 100 years and 
draws from foundation research classification schemes, including engineering, 
developmental, and formative types of research (Nunamaker & Chen, 1990).  The 
methodology combines processes, methods, and tools to conduct an investigative study.  
The investigation leads to results that contribute to the overall body of knowledge in 
applied systems development and new approaches to processes and products in the 
Information Systems domain.  At the research methods foundation, the systems 
development methodology is ideal for investigating, improving and creating new things 
(Nunamaker & Chen, 1990).  This research follows the proven repeatable method of 1) 
building a test system; 2) observing the behavior of the system; 3) testing the system with 
tools; 4) using the results to develop a new and better system (Hubbard, 2014).  In the 
case of this study the outlined method was used to research the present day Security 
Frameworks for mobile systems security and utilize executed testing results to create a 
better Security Framework that solved the stated problem for Machine-to-Machine 
(M2M) devices.   
Researchers have called for further study of security and privacy in M2M 
ecosystems, particularly in terms of how the requirements differ from those in present 
mobile systems such as Smartphone and messaging platforms (Accorsi, Stocker, & 
Müller, 2013; Alqassem, 2014; Chen, 2013; Chin, 2013).  Typical security practices 
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involve assessing the data that is being processed, assigning a classification to the data, 
and applying appropriate security controls to network elements that handle the data.  
Studying frameworks and system architectures in this way fleshes out a better policy and 
improve effectiveness for protecting M2M devices.    
 
Develop Advanced Theory 
Chin et al. (2013) accomplished their smartphone research by conducting 
interviews of users’ willingness to use a device for various tasks in order to test the 
hypothesis that people fear their privacy and security are at risk when smartphones are 
used and do not trust smartphone applications.  This method will not work in M2M, as 
the end points are devices and not people.   
This research hypothesized that the M2M ecosystem is even less understood and 
trusted by users because users are not aware of the advanced risks (Chen, 2013).  A 
proper study and requirements analysis method are vital for the development of all 
complex systems; without them, major problems are introduced in the complete system 
life cycle (Zafar, Arnautovic, Diabat, & Svetinovic, 2014).  A better security framework 
for M2M must offer and provide a trustworthy environment that builds the confidence of 
technology recipients and enforces security implementation at the design stage (Saeed, 
Tahir, Mughal, & Khan, 2014).      
 
Research Methods 
For M2M security, architects rely on use case development for framework 
validation, which has created a present framework that is only theoretical (Katt, Gander, 
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Breu, & Felderer, 2013).  This research observed and evaluated device changes, 
characteristics, and categories such as inputs, efficiency, effectiveness, outputs, quality, 
impact, and the usefulness of safeguards in order to develop a functional M2M security 
framework that includes and considers the capability if the devices, as supported by 
Alqassem (2014).  Leading to the understanding of the M2M development challenges and 
supporting evidence that there is a need for an overall IoT security design and testing 
method.  System prototyping was applied and practical applications used to gain 
knowledge as to how devices are presently protected and communicate with each other 
(Parkin, Moorsel, & Coles, 2009; Alqassem, 2014).  The table below shows the found 
differences and similarities between present smartphones and M2M devices.  These 
differences are why M2M devices must be secured using a new security framework.  
However, the similarities provide a foundation for testing and new methods development.   
The OWASP Mobile Security and OWASP Internet of Things Top 10 Project 
Methods (OWASP, 2014) offer a standardized and disseminated mobile, system 
applications and hardware risk model based on surveyed results.  Fortify (2014) reports 
that there are many techniques for testing individual platforms; however, these do not 
address the general M2M threat model.  The Fortify (2014) report used mobile device 
testing tools to examine and compare vulnerabilities found on smartphones and matches 
them to M2M devices vulnerabilities as depicted in Table 1, the below table outlines the 
comparison results of present smartphone devices and future M2M devices. 
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Table 1. Device Comparisons  
 Smartphones M2M Devices  
   
M2M Device Limits: 
Always mobile 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Strain on network 
resources 
No, mobile networks are 
engineered to balance these 
devices.  
Yes, the number of devices 
and yet unknown uses is a 
contributor.  
 
Support for legacy 
networks 
Somewhat—carriers are 
seeking to “sunset” the 2G 
network. 
Yes, these devices are 
engineered for mostly 2G 
and 3G networks only.  
 
Easy hardware and 
software upgrade 
Yes, full over-the-air support 
for device management.  
No, unknown ways for 
firmware and SIM updates 
to no SIM devices. 
 
Full command, control, 
and conflict management  
Yes No 
 
M2M Device Risks: 
    
Direct attacks Yes Yes 
 
Indirect attacks Yes Yes 
 
Infrastructure and data 
theft 
Yes Yes 
 
3rd party attacks Yes Yes 
 
Protocol attacks Yes Yes 
 
M2M Device Attack Vectors:   
Server side attacks No, not from a device user 
side.  
Yes, these devices talk to 
each other. 
 
Infrastructure attacks Not on a grand scale.   Yes, due to the federation 
of new platforms.   
 
RF side interception and 
eavesdropping 
  Yes Yes 
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Table 1. Device Comparisons continued 
Open gateway attacks No, mostly closed platforms.   Yes, undeveloped 
standards and open 
systems.   
 
Low power device side 
attacks 
 
 No  Yes 
M2M Device Vulnerabilities:   
Device control Yes, hackers have remotely 
powered on and off devices. 
Yes, attackers can take 
control of home networks, 
thermostats, or other 
connected devices via 
unprotected devices. 
 
Encryption No, strong encryption and 
authentication on end-to-
end systems.   
Yes, weak network 
protection and 
unencrypted data storage.  
 
Password No, most devices use signing 
key and password for 
firmware updates. 
Yes, devices do not 
validate Secure Socket 
Layer (SSL) certificates. 
 
API vulnerabilities  No, standards are defined.  Yes, weak standards that 
are still in development.   
 
Vulnerable protocol No, mature and proven 
protocols.  
Yes, protocol flaws and 
untested vulnerabilities.  
 
 
 
Note. Table built from Hersent, O., Boswarthick, D., & Elloumi, O. (2014)  M2M 
communications: A systems approach. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley Publishing.  
 
In this research we developed a new approach that addresses the specific threats 
to M2M devices by studying how the device might function when tested against proven 
and successful attack scenarios.  The results were then used to build the tested and new 
functional security design framework for M2M devices that is presented in Chapter 5.  
 
 
43 
 
 
Instrument Development and Validation 
The test environment resembled a real world M2M network and included all 
conditions, circumstances, and influences surrounding and affecting M2M devices.  The 
most important requirement for this test environment was the ability to systematically 
collect data (Bhunia & Mukherjee, 2014).  To ensure efficient data collection, this 
research use a combination of systems including a commercially available development 
M2M Control Center to implement visibility into the devices and devices side log files.  
The control center connects to M2M devices using the wireless network and enables 
devices management for analysis, diagnostics, connection history, and changes in 
configuration, and the log files report all actions and anomalies on the devices.  
 
 
Figure 1. Sample Testbed 
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The test bed shown in Figure 1, above, is made of GSM-based modules connected 
over the wireless network to the control center.  The Control Center provides device 
activation tools and allowed provisioning and upgrades to be performed for the device 
policy for testing and study.  This allowed for usage analytics when security policies 
were changed and product performance, when functions were increased.  
 
Examined Devices  
We used three prototype built M2M devices for testing, validation, monitoring, 
and control provisioning.  The devices were built to meet the needs of the Business Logic 
requirements as defined by the use case examples.  
 
Detailed Procedure 
The key to a reliable framework is the understanding and application of the 
system’s rules.  According to Yahya, Kamalrudin, Sidek, and Grundy (2014), one must 
apply detailed use case analysis to reach this understanding, or else the framework fails.  
For this research, the three below theoretical model example use cases were applied for 
analysis.  
Use Case 1 
 Request a device that allows a utility company to better manage remote devices 
without human interaction. 
Business Logic.  Business logic comprises the rules within the M2M application 
that define actions.  A sensor-controlled meter with real-time feedback and control of grid 
management devices is in place for Use Case 1. Tasks such as health and status checks 
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can be remotely performed and firmware updating takes place without hands-on access, 
which results in lower operational costs.  In addition, these devices more effectively 
distribute power by directing the power where it is needed and when, which results in the 
most efficient use of current assets and lower operational costs. It also decreases outages 
caused by over-current conditions.  Such devices help the utility company to more 
accurately predict load periods. 
Potential Impact.  Potential impact observes what occurs if the function is 
manipulated. In this case, the impact is the loss of operations’ controls and updates to the 
device and severing system.  
Device Data.  Device Data comprises inputs and outputs to Business Logic. The 
main data is messaging, in this case.  Regulatory takes precedent based on the example 
Use Case.  Data transmission, control features, network wide changes, and updates are 
vulnerable if attacked.  
Supporting Components.  Key elements include the sensor-controlled meter, 
switch, network, and backend. 
Use Case 2 
Explains a smart device that utility companies will offer to customers so that they 
can use smartphones, IVR, or web applications to self-service payments for electricity 
services. 
Business Logic.  A Smart Grid prepaid electricity device provides location 
specific data.  Prepaid electricity is a fully managed, hosted payment solution that 
interfaces with smart meters.  These devices have a “disconnect service” switch for real-
time payment processing.  
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Potential Impact. Inaccurate or manipulated data might be sent to the backend 
services. An incorrect disconnect may occur.  
Device Data. Data includes meter data, messages from the meter to the backend, 
backend on-off commands, and commands to meter notifying to send data. 
Supporting Components. Components include the meter, capillary-network, GPS, 
and backend system. 
Use Case 3 
 This device enables the utility to remotely monitor the premise, the work 
environment, and the health of specific systems. 
Business Logic.  A Smart Grid Cellular Communication Device with video and 
location transport strictly designed and developed for Smart Grid backup security. It 
allows a restart, disconnect functionality, and power shut-off at the premise, which results 
in a safer operational environment. 
Potential Impact. There is the risk of death or harm if the wrong system is shut 
down or the device fails to report the danger. 
Device Data.  Data includes automated shut-off messaging, reporting of location 
data, and picture data. 
Supporting Components. Supporting components include the meter, network, 
GPS, camera, and backend system. 
 
Data Analysis  
Most frameworks are built theoretically and conceptually.  Theories predict 
relationships, events, and behaviors.  A theoretical framework is an inductive process.  
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To prove that a framework adds value, theoretical predictions must be observed and 
evaluated (Liu, et al., 2014).  For this research, we observed and evaluated the critical 
interrelationships among concepts.  The following test performances were observed and 
evaluated.  
 The strength of the end-to-end security attributes within the framework.   
 The ways the security attributes interact with each basic component.   
 The availability to break down each component into functional units and 
scaled attributes.   
 How the defined units affect each security attribute.   
 Identification of model components associated with each attribute.   
 Comparison and contrast the frameworks for security and the overall value 
they offer.  
According to Alberts, Allen, and Stoddard (2012), some foundational work for 
security frameworks development has been performed, but has yet to materialize.  As a 
result, decision makers and users lack confidence in the security of emerging systems that 
have been developed (Buyens, Scandariato, & Joosen, 2009). 
According to Flood and Keane (2014), data analysis and systems design 
encompasses a beginning three-step process: information gathering, static analysis, and 
dynamic analysis.  For this research, the following method was used to extract 
information out of the use cases, as listed below.  
(1) Information Gathering: 
 Do the running applications provide security protections?  Example: 
Does the device allow SMS messaging?   
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 Are the networking interfaces protected?  Example: Is there mobile 
communication only or Wi-Fi wireless, too? 
 Are various networks supported?  Example: Various networks include 
2G, LTE, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth. 
 Do the networking protocols meet industry standards?  Example: Are 
secure protocols used, such as M2M/IoT (XMPP, MQTT)? 
 Are transactions performed that require additional security protections? 
Example: Do transactions include payment information, personal data, 
or location data? 
 Are hardware components exposed?  Example: GPS or Camera might 
be exposed.   
(2) Static Analysis: 
 Perform a detailed analysis of the device source code based on the 
Business Logic requirement.   
 Review the Operating System security framework.   
 Verify that all applications cannot be extracted.  
 Outline the permissions for authorized access.  
 Analyze configuration files and verify access controls.    
 Analyze all points where untrusted data entry may be inputted.  
 Outline the user authentication process.   
 Identify the functionality of inbound connections from other devices.  
 Perform privilege elevation analysis.  
 Test and analyze the encryption that is used on the device.  
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 Seek out device and platform exposed APIs.  
(3) Dynamic Analysis: 
 Depending on the device vs. Use Case, discover the vulnerability of all 
Native Mobile Applications running on the device.    
 Analyze the Web services in use from the device to the end server.   
 Verify the authentication process from the device to serving gateways.  
 Determine the access controls for gateways and aggregator devices.  
 Analyze the message delivery round-trip time for the M2M device.  
 Analyze the results of data manipulation generated by outside sources. 
Targets 
We identified the following device targets based on the data analysis from the 
example use cases.  
1. Web Applications:  Use Cases 1, 2, and 3 are all web interfacing scenarios 
with numerous opportunities for attackers to inject malicious code.  These 
devices run the risk of becoming weaponized attack tools that can be used for 
SQL injection or to expose cross-site scripting flaws.  These attacks can cause 
Denial of Service (DoS), XSS and HTML Injection errors, and attacks against 
web-facing applications. They can compromise sensitive information that is 
stored on devices (de Ipiña et al., 2005).  
2. Authentication:  Authentication of a device is of utmost importance within any 
system.  However, traditional authentication schemes always assume that a 
person is present.  M2M devices’ access methods are sometimes limited.  
Specific security requirements that are based on Use Case demand must meet 
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the unique needs of the framework and formally model the authentication for 
the ecosystems (Cha, et al., 2009).  
3. Authorization and Insufficient Transport Layer Protection:  Use Case examples 
2 and 3 call for sensitive data transport.  The M2M devices store local data and 
configuration files with limited resources.  Protection of the user’s privileges 
and discovery of bypass methods is required if the device is going to security 
transmit and store sensitive data; this includes the access to transport 
messaging and location data (Kothmayr, et al., 2013). 
4. Unintended Data Leakage during Session Management:  The devices and 
network management session must try to avoid aggressive transport of short 
sessions or transport of very long sessions of data to avoid data leakage.  The 
processing power behavior of small devices must reduce signaling and power 
overhead to protect sensitive information.  This includes logging and 
transition data, overhead messages between other components and devices, 
and sensitive user data. These devices are low powered and resource limited 
in processing, so they require smaller encryption keys than other devices like 
Smartphones, to protect against attack (Song, Kunz, Schmidt, & Szczytowski, 
2014). 
5. Cryptography:  M2M devices are vulnerable to brute force attacks.  If, in any 
of the Use Cases, such an attack is successful, the ecosystem as a whole is 
placed in danger.  These attacks expose applications and data information to 
the possible reconstruction of encrypted messages and exposure of weak 
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protocols in a Life/Safety function, which could cause harm or death (Gyrard, 
Bonnet, & Boudaoud, 2014).  
6. Untrusted Inputs and Binary Protections:  M2M devices have limited file and 
data storage capabilities in the cache and drive space.  It is imperative for 
security that no unprotected data is left on the devices and that unencrypted 
data storage is controlled, because this is where other weaknesses can be 
exploited (Dye & Scarfone, 2014). 
Exact Tests  
The exact tests have been outlined in the tables as shown in the Appendix A. 
section.  Described are the tests that were executed to verify device compliance and 
function capability as required by the defined use cases, the results then were used to 
build a “Functional Security Design Framework for M2M Devices”.  
When the results were shown to be different from expected it proved that the 
typical security practices require additional assessment and development leading to future 
research opportunity.  This outcome also proved that the devices do not meet the 
correctly assigned capability required as per the use cases, because the corresponding 
security controls were not identified during testing.  For a functional framework to be 
“functional,” the strength of the controls employed must be equivalent to the sensitivity 
level of the data.  If the device classification is “only” protected, this means that 
insufficient security has been applied.  The device and the data transported by the device 
will not address the overall role of a device in an M2M ecosystem.  The business logic 
and the potential impact sections of the use cases should lead to the security of the device 
and the capabilities will drive the development of the functional M2M security 
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framework. We used these sections to gain the knowledge to determine security controls, 
formulate better requirements and drive security architecture at the design stage of the 
device.  
 When the devices did not meet the requested function, then requirements were 
added or device components changed until the logic, data type, and potential impact 
balanced the risk.  Simply discovering vulnerabilities does not estimate the associated 
risk to the business, user, or ecosystem.  The Repeatable Method approach was used to 
allow for the evolutionary process to take place and for the discovery of new 
countermeasures against potential risks to the business, device, and user of the ecosystem 
to be realized.   
A Repeatable Method approach is required because vulnerabilities that are critical 
to one use case may not be very important to another use case.  We declare that 
functional frameworks should allow customized changes and retesting for each particular 
use case.  This flexibility helps to develop solid security requirements that satisfy the 
overall roles and classifications of a device placed within any particular end-to-end M2M 
function. 
 
Format for Presenting Results 
 In order to create a framework methodology, the following outline was used as a 
guide:  
1. Define specific functions and operations within M2M services. 
 A remote device control, for example, provides automated environment 
controls based on business-driven requirements. 
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2. Look at the properties of the various functions and operations within the 
service. 
 Does the function involve any of the following data? 
i. Non-sensitive information like error reporting   
ii. Personal private information like legal/ or regulatory statutes or 
protected data  
iii. Personal confidential, like identifying number addresses or assets  
iv. Payment/financial information  
v. Critical harm or financial loss   
vi. Life and death or could cause harm  
3. Identify and classify the functions in the M2M system.   
In the case of M2M, it is important to move beyond the data and network 
elements when determining security controls.  Elements in the M2M ecosystem may 
make automated decisions and take actions based not only on data, but also on associated 
business logic (Aslam, Gehrmann, & Björkman, 2013).  These actions may be referred to 
as functions that the device is capable of performing.  Within some scenarios, the same 
devices support functions of varying importance. Therefore, a method was needed to 
determine security controls for M2M that would classify the overall functions and apply 
proper security controls based on that functional security need as balanced by the 
device’s functional capabilities.  An M2M ecosystem will have multiple functions and 
needs.  Each function must be identified and classified to ensure that correct security 
controls are identified, that security recommendations are made, and that trust exists 
(Aslam, Gehrmann, & Björkman, 2013). 
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This research aimed towards a new and better security framework for the devices 
that depended on real-world device use cases, design-centric data collection, investigation 
of device changes, and device behaviors when security controls are applied to the M2M 
ecosystem (Accorsi, Stocker, & Müller, 2013).  Studying the foundation framework 
helped organize ideas and led to the development of a better framework based on 
efficient device tasks. 
 
Validate Methodology by Executing Within an Actual Production Project  
In order to develop a new framework, the following inputs from the theoretical 
functional classification framework were used: 
 Business logic (rules within the M2M application that define actions) 
 Device data (inputs and outputs to business logic) 
 Potential impact (consequence if the function is manipulated) 
These three inputs determine the overall functional classification of the Use Case, 
which will helped to ensure that security and privacy within requirements can be applied 
once the functional classification exercise has been completed (Abie & Balasingham, 
2012; Godfrey et al., 2015).   
M2M devices must be designed to perform a particular function.  These functions 
can be classified into categories ranging from “non-impacting” to “life-threatening” 
(Godfrey et al., 2015).  The final framework takes into consideration that the security 
controls applied to a particular device must be equal to the applied “classification” of the 
device.  Devices and the components inside these devices often lack fundamental security 
controls, such as secure boot, authentication and authorization, secure update capabilities, 
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and encrypted communications.  Framework rules created with application and device 
control-based functional classifications described lead to the development and 
enforcement of new industry standards and security policies (Alqassem, 2014). 
 
Resource Requirements 
Three M2M connection kits featuring the GSM/Wi-Fi modules were used to meet 
this study’s goals.  Also a M2M test bed for the development and experimental 
assessment of the framework’s security controls was built for the prototype devices.  
These devices are GSM/GPRS/EDGE devices that are running Unix operating systems 
and use the Web based API control application for management from a desktop.  These 
kits cost $999 each at the time of this research.  All software used was shareware or open 
source.  The M2M Control Center is provided free of charge as part of an innovation 
developer program.  The program offers a set of developer tools and real-time visibility 
into the device and network behaviors. Also, built for this research was a prototype Wi-Fi 
test bed system for device scanning and testing and a prototype 2G Cellular network test 
bed using OpenBTS and USRP radios to simulated the cellular network for security and 
performance testing.   
 
Summary 
 Security Frameworks are a set of tools that can be used to develop requirements 
for devices and systems.  These frameworks can also be used to test new business 
models, seek problem solutions, and forecast functionality.  This chapter outlines efforts 
that had been taken to refine the initial framework into a novel framework by testing new 
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models and developing new solutions to offer a new security framework for M2M 
devices.   
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Chapter 4 
Results  
 
Introduction 
 This research focused on the development of a new framework for securing M2M 
type devices by applying the System Development Methodology.  The goal of the 
analysis phase was to improve the knowledge of present processes, services, and 
functions. Researchers are concerned with present technology and how this technology 
may improve and be made more secure (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2015).  As described by 
Vaishnav and Kuechler (2015, p 285) new frameworks may be developed using a Model-
Driven Approach and drawn out of logical models that are developed from data collected 
during the prototype testing and analysis phase of the greater method.     
 The testing approach included both “requirements verification–based testing” and 
“attack based testing”.  The testing followed a pattern-based methodology leading to a 
step-by-step procedure for repeatable evaluation of M2M type devices.  This method 
provided a baseline for future testing by finding vulnerabilities on “function” oriented 
devices.  The baseline was formed around the air interface on both Wi-Fi and Cellular 
Wireless vulnerabilities.  Industry standard techniques that have revealed results when 
applied to similar devices such as smart-phones, Wi-Fi based devices and embedded 
device type systems were applied (Gubbi, Buyya, Marusic, & Palaniswami, 2013).  As 
explained in Chapter 3, Table 2, the OWASP Security Projects theorizes ten risks to 
various ecosystems.  Determined was that the hypothesis that “vulnerabilities are 
transferred to next technologies” is true when applying the described testing methods.  
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System and Testing Analysis 
 The requirements determination phase of the Systems Development Methodology 
for systems analysis is “prototyping”.  As explained by Dehghani and Ramsin, (2015) 
prototypes take on many forms and systems; process and models can be prototyped.  The 
Prototype Methodology is a technique and supplemental methodology of the Systems 
Development Methodology.  Holmlid and Evenson (2007) explain that prototypes 
explore future reality by distinguishing and comparing exploration and demonstration.  
To design the final framework we distinguished and compared prototyped physical 
testing results with prior literature review results.  The modeled theorized security 
framework is taken under analysis by executing both functional and evolutionary 
prototyping categorizations for output evaluation (Dehghani & Ramsin, 2015).  The 
functional test verifies actual system functions by using real and known attack scenarios.  
Once expected and actual results were verified and known, the evolutionary approach 
was then applied, producing reliable requirements for the better framework and final 
operational system. The operational system is built from the knowledge gained during the 
prototype testing which also led to a better understanding of the requirements required to 
secure M2M devices.  
 
Findings 
 This research focused on the device hardware, simple task oriented applications 
and data transport means.  Test (1) was the execution of full vulnerably scan to identify 
obvious attack points (Hager, 2013).  This approach focuses on identifying running 
services of the device such as operating systems and open ports.  Once known, next steps 
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to follow are realized and executed.  All test were run within private wireless networks 
consisting of various devices including two smartphones and three prototyped M2M-type 
devices. 
 
Weak Server Side Controls 
Expected and Actual Results  
 Results proved that there were vulnerabilities on all devices. Baseline 
vulnerability scanning was applied and directed towards analyzing “Weak Server Side 
Controls”.  This threat usually includes an untrustworthy input to a backend API service, 
web service, or traditional web server application.  When reversed, the process and focus 
is from the attack direction, originating from server towards the M2M-type device 
interface.  It was found that if an adversary sends malicious inputs or unexpected 
sequences to a device from a server the devices becomes a vulnerable endpoint and reveal 
attack vector.  
 Server-side control attacks are an important security threat when pointed towards 
the device.  Findings proved that when a user acts like a serving system and performs 
vulnerability scanning this identifies open ports on the devices. Also found during the 
scan was the assigned IP addresses, the device’s operating system, software, and services 
that are running on the device.  The additional finding showed that when devices are 
vulnerable to applications and have open communication ports they are exposed to 
attacks such as DoS, malware infestation and Cross-Site Scripting attacks.  Scanning for 
known vulnerabilities allows for the discovery of access opportunities.  Also, discovered 
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was that these test will impact the device communication protocols within the service-
layer and the storage of encryption keys for authentication.  
Improved requirement 
 Critical M2M devices should be protected against port scanners by hiding or 
closing all unused TCP and UDP ports.  Implementing Internet Protocol (IP) filtering and 
other firewall techniques on a device level will close any open connections to active 
sockets and protect the device from discovery.  Also, device applications must ensure that 
only required ports allow incoming connections and devices required to send content are 
patched with the latest security updates.  
 
Insecure Data Storage 
 Testing found that configuration settings impact data storage and expose 
vulnerabilities to the privacy and security of the messaging data.  This is important 
because, host discovery, port scanning, operation system detection, and service discovery 
all expose the running applications and stored data located on the device, which can be 
used to launch other attacks.  
Expected and Actual results:  
 It was expected that the results would show that the standard behavior for each of 
the events is capable of being identified on each device because there are no additional 
transport protections implemented.  As expected, the actual result proved that various 
TCP and UDP ports are opened on the M2M devices as well as the other network 
connected devices.  Knowledge gained from this test was that the devices are prototyped 
and the ports can be turned off or on.  However, for the device to communicate 
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seamlessly, applications such as SMS messaging must remain opened.  This case showed 
the device to be vulnerable to various known SMS attacks.  
 However, being able to scan a device is not a bad thing.  Discovering 
vulnerabilities or configuration errors results in understanding where intrusions can occur 
and leads to the development of better countermeasures. 
Improved requirement 
 M2M devices that allow for systematic scanning and allow review of process 
running should be controlled in a known manner by a central gateway or system.  Other 
devices require secure countermeasures against random port scanning.  Devices need a 
method for quarantining the applications and revoking the permissions after the 
applications are closed.  This method will prevent exposed ports, allowing only ports that 
are required for data transfer to be exposed.  In addition, for devices that communicate 
over the cellular network, updating the device communications module to 3G and placing 
a 3G or above smart card into the device for authentication and authorization would 
increase security and strengthens server side controls protections.   
 
Insufficient Transport Layer Protection 
 Findings proved that insufficient transport layer protections lead to improper 
session handling.  Service-layer keys and the storage of keys on the device is a known 
device vulnerability as described (oneM2M Partners, 2013).  The service layer consists of 
all the services that the manufacturer makes available on the devices or that is 
preinstalled by device peripherals.  The long-term service-layer consists of keys that may 
be discovered while they are stored on the devices.  If discovered, these keys may be 
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copied and used against the device or gateway during other attacks (Ukil, 
Bandyopadhyay, Bhattacharyya, & Pal, 2013). The services layer is highly vulnerable to 
attack because the data within the layer provides the business functionality that allows the 
devices’ supported communications and messaging to and from the gateway.  If copied, 
the long-term service-layer keys may be used to impersonate M2M devices to the 
gateways or vice versa (Latvakoski et al., 2009).  When long-term service-layer keys are 
stored within the M2M device or M2M gateways, they may be discovered during 
scanning by unauthorized entities (Minoli, 2015).  For example, Transport Layer Security 
(TLS) uses a cryptographic system with two keys to encrypt data (Hersent, Boswarthick, 
& Elloumi, 2011).  Once the keys are discovered, they can be used for illegitimate 
purposes, such as false authorization and authentication.  There are various methods for 
discovering open and available keys.  Hardware probing methods include the monitoring 
of internal processes or simply the reading of memory contents.  According to Lu, 
O’Neill, and McCanny (2010), DPA is a widely studied side-channel attack however this 
attack is outside the scope of this research. 
Improved Requirement  
 It is recommended that Random Delay Insertion (RDI) be deployed as a 
countermeasure technique.  However, M2M devices run weak cryptographic processes 
and do not have the resources for increased countermeasures that will reduce the risk of 
DPA attacks.  
Expected and Actual results 
 Findings showed that devices are impacted by the device communication 
protocols within the service-layer and the storage of encryption keys for authentication. 
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Also found was that wireless networks and configuration settings are impacted by these 
found vulnerabilities because the privacy and security of messaging is again at risk.  
There is no indication that these devices are protected and analysis proved that ports that 
are open and running on the device which can be exposed, leading to authorization and 
access to the device by rogue application execution.   
 We expected to find security vulnerabilities against the open ports and testing 
proved that there are inherent limitations to resources on these devices.  Actual results 
also showed that data is stored read-only with limited in storage time as required by 
standard policy.  However, the devices tested are prototyped devices and unsecure. So, as 
expected when testing Layer 2 with port pinging and scanning, open ports and device 
information, including the TCP IP Address and MAC address was exposed.  Testing also 
exposed that with low processing devices, repeated testing, freezes the devices and takes 
them off the network.  In particular, an Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) request, does 
determine that the host is alive and provides the MAC address of the devices in the return 
message.  When pinging the device (ICMP echo request) on all open ports using tools for 
flooding messages, the device fails because the flood message stresses the CPU to MAX 
usage.   
Improved Requirement 
 A better design for production M2M devices would be to limit or completely shut 
off of all “Ping” operation and stop Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) echo 
request packets from targeting the device and that all IPv6 security measure be used on 
M2M devices.  
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Network Layer Protection  
 Management and control frames are directly related to service-layer keys and 
focused on the Layer 3 frames because M2M data is serviced by three present 
requirements: massive data analysis, real-time data analysis, and deep data analysis 
(Kitagami, Yamamoto, Koizumi, & Suganuma, 2013).  Information stored in the devices 
can be detected and used by an attacker to compromise these systems.  The device is also 
at risk of being spoofed or turned into an attacking device or for attaching to a fake 
access point or a fake base station.  Management and control frames must be protected to 
protect the protocol stack (Lin, 2008).  Unprotected protocol stacks may lead to denial of 
service (DoS), Man-in-the-middle (MinM), and similar attacks.  This vulnerability can 
prevent the operation of the overall M2M service. 
Expected and Actual results  
 Test directed towards Network Layer Protection and Insecure Data Storage found 
that M2M devices are vulnerable to stored management and control frames discovery on 
Layer 2 as described by Hersent, Boswarthick, and Elloumi (2011).  When testing the 
possibility of locating service-layer keys within the protocol stack and the device, it was 
found, that these keys could be reused, deleted, or changed.  The M2M device tested use 
AT COMMANDS as input and out messages.  These commands are transferred over the 
service-layer and a compromise will return information that impacts the constraints on 
the device.  The discovery of authentication frames and open data transfer may be used 
for Layer 3 attacks such as DoS and Man-in-the-Middle attacks.  The analysis found that 
there are weaknesses in the various protocols.  These are known vulnerabilities in the 
GSM stack. As expected, sending different configuration messages to the device on each 
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port exposed the GSM vulnerabilities.  Running successful scans against layer 3 and layer 
4 discovered that the host is alive.  However, the open and closed TCP ports did fail to 
return an “Acknowledgment” to messaging and did lock the test devices when a 
particular port was addressed in the execution string.     
Improved Requirement  
 When deploying M2M device communications, each device and gateway should 
be isolated over a shared network infrastructure.  This network should provide 
management and provisioning using a tunnel type protocol for secure data transfer and 
access authentication.  
 
Unintended Data Leakage due to Improper Session Handling 
 The M2M devices’ Open Standards are untested because of lacking transparency 
and undefined guidelines; the use of open standards makes the device vulnerable to 
attackers (Torbensen, 2011).  Because these devices are usually built from commercial 
off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software, attackers can seek knowledge to expose 
open vulnerabilities (Igure, Laughter, & Williams, 2006).  Many M2M devices run a 
small version of Linux as an operating system.  Components such as cameras and Wi-Fi 
nodes are run and accessed through files that are usually located in the file systems of the 
operating system (OS) and these files communicate directly with the kernel driver that 
communicates with the component hardware; leaving them vulnerable to data leakage 
attack (Yaoming, 2010). 
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Expected and Actual results  
 Unintended data leakage and improper session handling testing indicates that 
sessions can be easily exposed and, once found, can lead to vulnerability.  As 
environmental conditions change, the RF signal, in or out data, and messaging should all 
continue to match a specified value as described by the standards. Actual results showed 
that vulnerabilities are successfully found over Wi-Fi and GPRS, proving that needed 
information to ensure a successful penetration attack is available and device compromise 
probable.  The knowledge gained was that when using a threat assessment tool the 
complexity and severity of a single point of failure on the device is identified by open IP 
addresses, active machine names and opened various port identification points; protocol 
vulnerabilities.  This information leads to the discovery of running services on specific 
ports for exposure by untrusted inputs.  The interfaces are then exposed to attack and 
directed by security decisions, untrusted inputs, and insecure data storage vulnerabilities.  
The discovery proves that the devices lack human user interface and tampering resistance 
notification as described by Hagar (2013).  
Improved Requirement 
 All components must communicate transparently, regardless of their hardware 
and software (Bernardi, Merseguer, & Petriu, 2013).  This is important because the 
critical infrastructure includes the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
networks such as the natural disaster early warning systems, crime prevention cameras, 
and a range of vulnerabilities from equipment failures to terrorist attacks that threatens 
the ecosystems (Igure, Laughter, & Williams, 2006). 
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Protocol tampering and device repurposing  
 M2M systems are designed to function without human interaction. However, 
M2M message traffic, data transfer, and content are influenced by human-based traffic, 
such as location data, billing data, and personalized content.  The M2M device must also 
be monitored, repaired, and managed by humans (Cha, et al., 2009).   
Expected and Actual results 
 It is found that ability to detect tampering and design flaws in the device is not 
possible because there is a lack of monitoring systems that allows for remote device-user 
interaction. 
Improved Requirement 
  M2M devices may be targets of physical tampering, repurposing, or modification 
and require that failure indicators, such as on/off settings, hardware status, and network 
control or alarms that transport over alternative networks be in place.  These fail 
indicators will allow an operator to take action on alarms and protect against an attacker 
performing remote hacking on management or maintenance interfaces or using the device 
as an attack tool.  
 
Unrestricted File Upload/Download 
 Findings exposed that testing directed towards unrestricted file 
“upload/download” reveals the possibility of an unrestricted file upload to the M2M 
infrastructure from the device (Flick & Morehouse, 2010; Skianis, 2013).  The 
vulnerability affects databases, operating systems, and applications that are developed for 
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internal use and the end severing systems. In the case of M2M ecosystems that are 
connected to the Internet with unrestricted access, these platforms lack restrictions on the 
size or number of uploaded files that are sent to and from devices.  Files that are too large 
will consume resources and freeze the device operations (Flick & Morehouse, 2010).  
When open access to SSH or FTP servers is found the device data storage is at risk.  If an 
attacker uploads or transfers files of dangerous types using an automated processed 
within the M2M ecosystem, for example, via open FTP ports, the ecosystem does not 
block the “input file” and actual result show this to be true, making it possible for the 
device to be weaponized.   
Expected and Actual results 
 As expected there was the discovery of UDP ports and these ports are open and 
actual results prove that these ports remain open after message transfer.  However, the 
tools identified that open ports are only open until closed by the communication software.  
It was observed that it is very easy to identify hosts using discovery against UDP and 
probing an isolated task and that the ICMP host are unreachable when requesting 
“responses” to identify live hosts with UDP requests on closed ports was discovered as 
expected.  Additional scanning reported that all open ports for discovery allow for 
fingerprinting of services.  Testing discovered, for example, that port 22 (SSH) is opened 
on the device but the other ports are closed.  SSH is opened at install of the OS and not 
closed at reboot leaving an open door opportunity for device compromise.  
Improved requirement   
 M2M devices must protect against the discovery of sensitive data.  The protection 
of sensitive data in M2M devices and M2M gateways leads to protection against broken 
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cryptography and lack of binary protections (Pandey, Choi, Kim, & Hong). M2M 
devices, such as sensors, collect data that is sensitive, including toxic levels of poison, the 
temperature of machinery, and personal consumer data.  The execution of sensitive 
functions and the storage and transfer of this information must be protected.  
 
Broken Cryptography and Lack of Binary Protections   
 According to Pandey, Choi, Kim, and Hong (2011), the M2M ecosystem has 
important characteristics that other ecosystems do not, like, sleeping devices, low power 
devices, weak signal networks, and low device intelligence.  Because of this the 
ecosystem is vulnerable to automated service discovery.  In such an environment 
automatic execution of software and storage of sensitive data may lead to a higher level 
of compromise potential (Cha et al., 2009).  Needed is a workable level of encryption on 
all communications between the device and server that takes the device limitation into 
consideration and protects against the attacking of sensitive functions within the M2M 
device.  
Expected and Actual results 
 As we expected, it is possible to capture sensitive information that is outbound or 
sent to the device.  However, the data itself is protected by the communication protocol 
security policy.  Actual results proved that data is protected in the cellular network 
because of the secure communications protocols, access and authentication methods that 
are provided by the SIM Card.  Knowledge gain included that if encryption is turned on 
then all transfer communication is protected, however, as expected, when off, 
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information is transferred in the clear.  Without proper communication encryption the 
devices are subject to attacks such as eavesdropping.  
Improved requirement 
 It is important and recommended that there is no exposed sensitive data and that 
protections are in place to prevent unauthorized entities from using this data for 
illegitimate purposes, transmitted data should be deleted from the device.  Eavesdropping 
of cryptographic resources discloses identities and exposes knowledge of sensitive 
information.  The ease of eavesdropping during prototype testing revealed that poor 
authorization and authentication and broken cryptography are vulnerabilities with M2M 
devices over Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and Cellular.  It is expected the other radio technologies, 
such as ZigBee are just as vulnerable but more investigation is recommended as future 
research.  Eavesdropping testing found that the M2M device service-communication 
protocols that connect the device to the gateway are vulnerable as described (Kylanpaa, 
Rantala, Merilinna, & Nieminen, 2013).  In addition, as reported Ren, Yu, Ma, and Ren 
(2013), all real-time, wireless communication-oriented overlay networks, like M2M 
capillary systems and federated systems, operate within “registration based” versus 
“location lookup quire” architectures.  This architecture requires special security 
requirements because vulnerabilities may result in a breach of security from real-time 
eavesdropping on data transfer and messaging.  
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Eavesdropping 
 Also, results found that the feasibility of eavesdropping on the M2M Service 
Layer does expose messages between internal components and the available 
cryptographic resources that may expose confidential or private information. 
Expected and Actual results 
 The network and device tasks are separate from each other by the various inside 
security systems including the SIM cards and OS security containers.  However, when 
testing over cellular there are known weakness in the GSM protocol stack that is 
exploitable and makes eavesdropping possible. These protocol weaknesses also may lead 
to jamming, false base station impersonation and cipher vulnerabilities in GSM.  
Improved requirement  
  Layered security at chip design is required, such as a layered approach will 
blanket the device and focus on the device as the secure endpoint from the component 
level.  Also, applications should have a separation of functions that prevent tasks from 
being hijacked, which would make them less vulnerable to eavesdropping. 
 
Jamming  
 M2M ecosystems connect to various types of radio frequency networks.  An 
attacker may purchase commercially available jamming devices with enough power to 
jam a radius or radio ranges from a few feet to over a mile. 
Expected and Actual results 
 It is found that jamming attacks do block and degrade the radio channels that 
connect the M2M device to the base station and Wi-Fi access points.  These attacks cause 
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a Denial-of-Service attack towards the device. This is an “over-the-air” attack and is 
executed by either sending strong signals over the same frequencies used by the device or 
by directly consuming the channels available at the base station.  Actual results prove that 
the injection of RF amplification, noise, and spurious connections effectively disrupts the 
communications between the device and the cell tower.  In other words, jamming denies 
service of the radio spectrum to the cellular network within range of the M2M devices 
and forces the device to seek a signal making the device vulnerable to a false base station 
attack.   
Improved Requirement  
 M2M devices are low power devices that are vulnerable to both active and 
passive jamming attacks that degrade or completely block all communications in a 
prescribed area of operations.  It is recommended that in critical communication 
scenarios, anti-jamming techniques be deployed such as a gateway with hopping signals 
for RF transport or multi-radio (ZigBee, Wi-Fi, and Cellular) capabilities are used.  
 
Network Impersonation/False Base Station  
 It is possible to attack a legitimate GSM network with a modified Cellular Base 
Station (Fake Base Station).  The goal is to exploit the weakness in M2M devices when 
the device seeks the strongest radio signal from the GSM network.  Once locked on to the 
strongest RF signal, the device camps on the false base station.  The false base station 
assigns radio channels that look legitimate to the device.  The target device is then out of 
reach of the authentic carrier’s paging signals.  The device registers to that network, 
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believing it is locked on the serving network, such an attack is comparable to radio 
jamming and is very difficult to counteract effectively in any radio system (3GPP, 2002).   
 Also, a compromised base station can act as a repeater.  In repeater mode, the 
attack platform functions as a relay for requests to the legitimate network.  These systems 
are located in-between the network and the target user, causing a Man-in-the-Middle 
scenario.  In this case the legitimate service requests and/or paging messages for the 
target M2M device can be modified or ignored by the attacking system.  In the security 
architecture of most wireless systems, there is no prevention mechanism against the false 
BTS relaying messages.  As previously noted the device is only seeking authentication.   
Expected and Actual results  
 As expected it was found that in the security architecture of 2G/3G cellular, there 
is no prevention mechanism against the false base station relaying messages.  As 
previously noted the device is only seeking authentication.  During actual testing, results 
proved that transmitted packets could be received at the device leading to the 
impersonation of the network.  This is the capability whereby the intruder type system 
sends signaling and/or authentication data to the device in an attempt to make the device 
believe the authentication originate from known good network.  However, this is a known 
problem with Wi-Fi, 2G and 3G cellular networks and leads to a false base station 
(cellular) or rogue access point (Wi-Fi), once the device is locked onto an attack system 
the vulnerabilities with in the communication protocols can be targeted (3GPP, 2001).   
Improved requirement  
 M2M device should have firmware that detects and fingerprints all connected 
network characteristics. 
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Risky Communication Protocols 
 Weak communication protocol design leads to session injection (Fuzzing) and 
exposes vulnerabilities and other weaknesses in the transport layer. Protections against 
client side injection and security decisions via untrusted inputs were identified during 
testing and a needed countermeasure for M2M devices is required.  Alteration of M2M 
communication protocols and messaging between devices and gateways were proven to 
be vulnerable as described by Sheng et al., (2013).  This validates, the Chen and Ma 
(2014), statement that the different communication protocols presently in use within the 
wireless and wire-lined systems will cause a protocol security gap.  This gap may 
potentially lead to a threat against the M2M ecosystem.  Protocol level device attacks 
include Man-in-the-Middle and Denial-of-Service attacks.  Exploitation of network 
services weaknesses and over-the-air management is also vulnerable.  When exploring 
the transaction layer and its protocols, it was explained that message exchange between 
the devices and gateway can be altered in the M2M ecosystem by forcing the device off 
the core network and executing fuzzing attacks as described by Chen and Ma, (2014). 
Expected and Actual results  
 The device to gateway communications defaults to the cellular 3G protocols and 
authentication method when a 3G SIM is used for access and authentication, protecting 
against known 2G vulnerabilities.  However, actual results proved that the device can 
then be forced back to 2G, allowing manipulation of the interaction between the device 
and network.  Knowledge gained included that the devices with the GSM/GPRS SIM will 
register with the open networks.  Also, it was verified that the devices are not resistant to 
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GSM fuzzing when flooded with SMS type messages.  However, a full suite of created 
test cases was not applied for full fuzz testing, this is recommended as future research.  
Improved Requirement  
 It is recommended that protections be placed on the device at each individual 
component level, a device is not security if all components are secure at the design stage. 
These added active security protections would protect the device’s operational 
environment and will restrict access to data, protect message transport and secure 
firmware access.  
  
Messaging Manipulation  
 Any alteration or manipulation of the messaging protocol may lead to the 
readability of sensitive information or modification of message content (Chen & Ma, 
2014).  Replay Messaging facilitates false base station roaming because of improper 
session handling and lack of transport layer protection (Latvakoski et al., 2014). 
Latvakoski et al., (2014) adds that the transport data, signaling data, and control data 
require added security measures for correct transmission of messages.  This data passes 
between the devices and gateways through the physical layer or protocol layers. If the 
protocol is compromised, all services are affected.   
Expected and Actual results  
 We found that when a replay attack occurs an attacker can copy messages 
between devices and gateways and use them to defeat authentication.  Replay attacks 
damage transaction information by allowing for the modification, insertion, or deletion of 
legitimate user data or signaling message structures.  Leading to the discovery of the 
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device because of the lack of identity mechanism and lack of protection against deceptive 
or fraudulent message content.   As expected, result concluded that the attack can exploit 
the lack of protection in the communications service layers and that this lack might lead 
to replay or playback of network data transmissions.  Also, actual results concluded that 
the devices roam and register with the false base station only when the SIM card is 
allowed to drop to 2G cellular coverage.  We gained the knowledge that M2M devices 
can be compromised and that if a gateway is used as a base station, the gateway can also 
act as a repeater.  In repeater mode, the attacker may compromise various functions by 
requesting data and access into the legitimate network allowing a Man-in-Middle type 
attacks.  
 
Untrusted Inputs  
 When considering the Man-in-Middle type attacks as another version of 
unauthorized or corrupted applications of untrusted inputs, these expose vulnerabilities 
from unauthorized, corrupted or modified messages to and from M2M devices (Ho, et al., 
2013).  Jeon, Lee, Park, and  Jeong, (2013) explained that most unknown replay attacks 
are not detected at the device level, this will be even more exposed in a  mutual cluster 
authentication or mesh network architecture environment such as those in a capillary 
M2M ecosystem.  Unauthorized devices may run software that authorizes functions to 
create vulnerabilities that impersonate the network and device management platform 
which might expose other connected devices (Liu, 2012).   
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Expected and Actual results  
 We found that the feasibility of an attacker to impersonate the network and device 
management platform by temporary failing the input and output communication protocol 
is plausible.  Once completed the attacker could fail the device by reporting fake device 
consumption, breaching privacy, or reporting confidential information; which would lead 
to the attacker’s control of remote management functions.  As expected the 
communications protocols that are utilized by the device have known weaknesses, which 
allows for the manipulation of interaction between the device and the end gateway. 
Actual results proved, that the gateways provide services via the packet switched 
protocols that may be subjected to attack.  Other communications protocols like those 
between the core-network of the cellular network architecture, outside databases and 
networks elements like switch routing and management functions, may also be vulnerable 
(Huber and Huber 2002). We gained the knowledge that in M2M ecosystems that are 
using primary radio/antenna component for GSM networks, the IMSI catching attack 
using the false base station transceiver it is possible to attack in the same manner as that 
of mobile phone attacks. As described, the devices see the base station as a legitimate 
carrier’s network.  Per specification and design, the devices seek the “best” power 
received transmission, once found the device transmits its identifier data, such as IMSI 
and system interdependencies. The Man-in-the-Middle attack is also possible because of 
poor authorization and authentication methods (Kim, Jeong, & Hong, 2013).  According 
to Kim, Jeong, and Hong (2013), it is difficult to detect or prevent the Man-in-the-Middle 
attack in the M2M ecosystem.  In IoT, the problem is elevated due to the difficulties of 
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managing or controlling each device independently within the ecosystem and the 
probability of federated networks and device-to-device communications.  
Improved Requirement  
 It is recommended that new approaches and standards for the ecosystem apply 
new security requirements that address the resource constraints of present networks and 
device.  This vulnerability is possible because of the device inability to detect replay 
messaging.  The IoT ecosystems lack requirements and methods for protection against 
these type attacks.   
 
Situational Recognition 
 According to Jin (2013), M2M ecosystems lack the proper device situational 
recognition within the systems that certifies the platform and message protections.  
Today, these systems use identity-based algorithms for situational recognition and a 
convergence framework to analyze certification technology.  In addition, Man-in-the-
Middle attacks target integrity and confidentiality from a messaging standpoint, which 
allows the attacker to take over as the core network by representing the gateway to the 
device.  
Expected and Actual results  
 As explained and expected, the M2M devices successfully roam to a fake network 
that is impersonating a gateway because they look legitimate to the device.  Actual results 
prove that the Man-in-the-Middle attack vector exists and can be executed from various 
devices and tools (i.e. AP or fake AP capability and RF spoofing).  
 
79 
 
 
Improved Requirement 
  M2M devices require a new and higher level of authentication to protect the end-
to-end communication and data transmission.   
 
Unintended data leakage 
 Improper session handling leads to venerable data storage and unintended data 
leakage.  M2M networks have sector to subsector interdependencies that when threaten 
will lead to cascading impacts across domains (Macaulay & Singer, 2011).  Improper 
message content delivery affects the overall ecosystem environment, because the 
information that a message contains included the various contexts of interdependencies.  
For this research, interdependencies are defined as types of intelligence that are 
actionable, such as asset ownership, location, and device role (Bianchi, 2014).  At risk are 
the underlying systems and resources that may impose many forms of vulnerabilities on 
interdependencies that directly relate to failures of the ecosystems’ critical 
infrastructures.  For this research, interdependencies are defined, as anything that can be 
used as an attack vector and that shares resources with other applications or devices.  
Expected and Actual results  
 As expect it was found that the principle of least privilege is enforced by the 
device’s operating system and that all system dependencies are secured to the same or 
higher level of assurance as other programs.  Actual testing found that no privilege user 
information is stored on the devices that were tested.  This is also true when reviewing 
data logged at the control center; the center applies context awareness and only provides 
device level information such as MEID, IMEI, SIM ID and OS VERSION information.  
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Improved requirement   
 It is recommended that context awareness be provided to M2M devices in the 
same manner as it is deployed on mobile devices.  This means that all stored relevant 
information; including the owner of the device, network authentication keys, and other 
specific access policies must be protected (Cam-Winget & Didier, 2014).  Lack of 
context-awareness will break applications such as device authentication and key 
generation (Hagar, 2013).  If there is a lack of context awareness it threatens how the 
device functions over the M2M ecosystems.   
 
Lacking API protections  
 M2M devices transmit to other devices including sensors, actuator, gateways and 
end systems.  For successful security and scalability a secure application-programming 
interface (API) must be used to ensure that the protocols are protected.    
 Expected and Actual results  
 As expected all the running applications used for external communications to the 
network functioned as designed.  Protection for the authentication and prevention of 
manipulation of the messaging protocol are in place at the clients and servers.  However, 
actual results did show that the devices expectedly will move to rogue access points and 
false base stations.  Once connected to these networks the device may be accessed using 
the vulnerabilities in a published API.  The device uses a published API during 
communication with the Control Center.  Increased knowledge added that when handling 
exceptions, such as when the device is moved to a rogue network, there is no error 
message sent to or from the Control Center.   
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Improved requirement  
 A better messaging protocol would apply an “alarm” type message. M2M devices 
are being deployed as a “one size fits all” box that will function as a tool for other 
devices, gateways, and applications.  This increases the risks associated with security, 
privacy and data protection.   
  
Buffer Overflows 
 The application framework of all devices manages the functions that performs 
various tasks; like resource management and call management. When an erroneous 
condition, such as a buffer overflow, occurs, the device processing power is stressed 
beyond the boundaries of the store data buffer limits and may lessen the difficulty of a 
buffer overflow condition (Hagar, 2013).  This condition leads to extra data overwriting 
and failure of the device processor’s memory locations, which causes the device to fail 
(Shewale, Patil, Deshmukh & Singh, 2014).  A buffer overflow condition attacks corrupt 
data, crashes the program, or causes the execution of malicious code.  As described by 
Hagar (2013), when sending data and messages to various abbreviations of application, 
program interfaces (APIs) show no “failed error messages” or device side alarms.  All 
APIs are designed to have length constraints for the utilization of storage, data locations, 
and code.  These constraints define execution space and help to find any vulnerabilities 
that enable the execution of applications. 
Expected and Actual results 
  As expected the exploitation of buffer overflow vulnerabilities can be exposed. 
What is important is at what point and the measurement of “ease of action” of the testing. 
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The expected buffer overflow happens at the point where the message is received and the 
device tries to store the message.  Although, actual results found that no buffer overflow 
is found on the prototype devices, it is important to note that the serial data transmission 
is very slow and failed.  Knowledge gained was that the communications module on the 
device has a limited buffer size and the header size fails when bigger files are received; 
causing a buffer overflow.  
Improved Requirement  
  It is recommended that limiting the buffer size and using a GET method with 
short answer for all requested and using AT COMMANDS for HTTP communication 
should be limited based on device function. Increasing the buffer size leads to false data 
injection opportunity and increases the likelihood of client side injection (Lu, et al., 
2012).  According to Lu et al. (2012), networks and devices like M2M are seriously 
threatened by injection attacks.   
 
False Data Injection  
 These attacks threaten authentication if an attacker can discover the capability of 
bypassing administrative privileges.  Once discover that attacker can view sensitive 
information and can alter contents stored in the device.  If the availability of data is 
compromised, the authentication process may be defeated.  In that case, all sensitive 
information on the device is at risk.  Increasing this risk opens the device to remote 
command execution techniques that can send mass injections to the device by executing a 
simple text-based attack and injection vector.  
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Expected and Actual results  
 As expected injection attacks can be mitigated by strong authentication process 
such as 2G/3G authentication.  However, the small size, low power, and unattended 
operations of M2M devices make a false data injection a higher risks because a 
compromised M2M device can launch other attacks.  Actual results found that various 
forms of side-channel attacks can be performed against encryption/decryption algorithms 
flaws and vulnerabilities.  However, SQL injection attacks against the device produced 
no failing results.  This is because there are no Web applications running on the devices. 
Test against a client side injection attacks and HTML-5 cross-site scripting attacks also 
did not fail these devices.  However, the fault injection attack, timing attack, EM analysis 
attack, and power analysis attack are known cryptographic attacks used against mobile 
devices successful. It is probable that these attacks will fail M2M devices due to the 
function specific task they perform. Knowledge gained contributed that fault injection 
freezes the device CPU.  The timing attack was inconclusive based on how long the 
device takes to execute commands when the fault injection script is running, causing the 
device to reboot.  This result is considered a successful DoS attack because it causes the 
device to fail the session.  
Improved Requirement  
 M2M device should be task driven and limited to receiving messages and perform 
only function related operations to mitigate attack opportunity.   
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Lacking Session Management 
 Session Management failure will lead to improper session handling and broken 
authentication because of misconfiguration (Lake, Milito, Morrow, & Vargheese, 2013).  
According to Okugawa, Masutani, and Yoda (2005), M2M networks are self-organizing 
and composed of scattered small devices that require the survivability of simultaneous 
communicating endpoints, the identity of the device is a key to managing the moving 
parts of the ecosystem.  If the session management or authentication is broken, all 
ecosystem functions are at risk of attack (Lake, Milito, Morrow, & Vargheese, 2013). 
Vulnerabilities in session authentication protocols lead to integrity and privacy issues 
because of key exchange failures and setup integrity flaws.  These flaws fail at session 
shutdown and within authentication schemes such as logout, account update, and session 
timeout and device application methods of ensuring key privacy.  
 Misconfiguration attacks exploit configuration weaknesses that can fail account 
access protections, expose patching flaws, compromise unprotected files and directories, 
and grant unauthorized access to the device.  Most devices are provided “off-the-shelf” 
with unnecessary and unsafe features that are enabled by default, including backdoor 
accounts, special access mechanisms, and incorrect permissions.  Researchers have 
compromised device security configuration by reviewing the unauthorized access to 
sensitive information security policies.  This leads to the compromise of the device and 
M2M ecosystem by granting unauthorized access to or providing knowledge of devices, 
accounts, applications, and platform.  
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Expected and Actual results  
 As we expected we found that the device environments are easily accessible and 
exploitable because all applications have permission to run, that based configuration files 
are not properly locked down, that clear text reveals username and password type data, 
and that database connection strings are set to default settings in configuration.  
Additional results found that services and applications can be turned “off and on” 
because the root login/password is known.  Knowledge gained proves that there are 
design and development-related vulnerabilities.  
Improved Requirement 
 Authentication or session management functions must verify device identity. 
Also, for message content there should be no exposed accounts, passwords, or session 
IDs.  During open sessions it is expected that no data is visible other than the 
authenticated data and that data should be visible on the device only after the termination 
of the session and that all data should be removed from the logs after an inactivity 
timeout.  An additional requirement is the importance that M2M devices are configured 
to perform as few tasks as possible to prevent security misconfiguration.  If a device’s 
security is misconfigured, then various events can take place that may hinder the device’s 
performance (Hongsong, Zhongchuan, & Dongyan, 2011).  
 
Useable Cryptanalysis 
 On-device platforms include local databases and file systems that usually have 
very limited access control protection.  System data and credential are managed and 
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stored in applications.  Access to these internal systems must only be granted after 
explicit confirmation of the requesting entity.  
Expected and Actual results  
 As expected cryptanalysis on the device requires improvements and needed are 
new methods to protect message context and secure plaintext data transport for low 
power/battery operated devices.  M2M devices lack encryption algorithms that do not 
require large key sizes and keep data confidential during static events.  Actual results 
found that the mobility characteristic of a wireless system/platform that a mobile 
application runs on, protection of application, user data and system data is very important 
in securing the M2M device.  
Improved requirement  
 M2M devices must protect data on the system and must be stored locally, all 
information should be encrypted in storage using local key store, and file system 
protection should be in place and secure access to nonvolatile memory protected.   
 
Unauthorized access 
 Valid input of data is required to ensure content is provided to applications 
securely (Ellinas, Panayiotou, Kyriakides, & Polycarpou, 2015).   It is important that 
M2M devices and gateways have the functionality to detect and prevent unauthorized 
access to the ecosystem.  In the case of ecosystem federation, there is the possibility to 
have non-existent communications security between devices, due to lack of requirements 
requiring protection against invalid input data and parameters that outline qualifier, 
range, and data fields.  For mitigation, stronger message authentication is required and 
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lightweight encryption should be used to provide confidentiality (Shah, Perrig, & 
Sinopoli, 2008; Awad, 2015).  The M2M ecosystem passes communications over various 
networks and these devices are capable of sending messages and data using protocols 
such as HTTP or SIP.  Cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks target events and may allow for 
code or data injection that disrupts the communication path (Siewruk, Sredniawa, 
Grabowski, & Legierski, 2013).  As described it is feasible to use forbidden commands to 
bypass filters on a device using alternate forms of messaging syntax, which will cause the 
device to fail when processing, this is due to the protocol weakness using a cross-site 
scripting process by executing arbitrary commands from SMS messages.  
Expected and Actual results  
 As expected the ability to bypass filters where “scripts” are executed is a 
prohibited functionality and all input from the server side is validate.  The data-input does 
not fail the device when sent as described by the standards.  The device validation 
application prevents and protects unauthorized input from infecting other on-board 
applications.  Actual results employ automated tools and scripts in a non-reduced time 
frame and led to the potential cross site scripting, verbose errors and forceful browsing as 
expected with typically automated tools.  
Improved Requirement  
 Only authorized specific types of data should be sent to and from the device. 
Maintenance and control messaging should be completed from a protect platform such as 
a firmware over the air (FOTA) platform, that protects the devices. 
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Summary  
Findings support the hypothesis that the M2M ecosystem is even less understood and 
trusted because of unknown vulnerabilities and advanced risks.  Conclusions are based on 
expected and actual analysis using a prototype approach.  Prototyping is a sub-method 
within the overall System Development Methodology.  The present framework “OWASP 
Internet of Things Top 10, (2014)” addresses the field of Internet of Things 
vulnerabilities from a risk point of view and is developed from results of polling industry 
leaders about the threat landscape. This framework has been offered as a security 
template for manufacturers to build better secure products and system developers to 
address requirements for M2M ecosystem security, but is focused on the end-to-end 
threats as identified in Figure 2.  We found that a better Internet of Things security 
framework exposes five key vulnerabilities that threaten the M2M device.  Holmlid and 
Evenson (2007) explain that prototyping explores future reality. By applying distinguish 
analysis of testing results, we validated the theoretical framework. Then we improved the 
framework with additional tested enchantments that addresses the threats as depicted in 
Figure 2.  Using analysis, we validated the prototype testing, using the theoretical   
framework and “literature reviewed” expected results. Actual results from testing were 
then extracted and used for the final design of the New Security Framework and the 
discovery next generation threats facing M2M devices.  Additionally, the hypothesis that 
“vulnerabilities are transferred to next technologies” is supported; based on expected and 
actual testing results.  We found that M2M devices do lack secure authentication, session 
key exchange schemes, and adequate cryptographic storage for small packet 
transmission.   
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Figure 2. Threat Framework (Horton, 2014)  
 
 M2M devices lack these because the devices have low power requirements, 
insufficient processing ability, and associated resource constraints.  The ability and ease 
of finding keys, viewing clear text copies of data and accessing channels automatically 
without decrypting data threatens the secure cryptographic storage.  The highest threat to 
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M2M devices is Denial of Service, which is triggered by weak legacy communication 
protocols and known radio-side vulnerabilities.  As stated, the System Development 
Methodology used for this research is based on building blocks. The blocks were 
constructed in 3 Phases.  Chapter 4 was the Prototyping phase where the primary and 
secondary analysis took place. The research performed in the Prototyping phase helped 
build the required “knowledge” of vulnerabilities and allowed for the “discovery” of 
problems threatening M2M devices, which then directed the development of the final 
framework shown in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary  
 
 Guided by the systems development research methods, the purpose of this study 
was to develop a validated and improved security framework for M2M devices that 
addresses the threat landscape of the Internet of Things.  This study included a history of 
Wireless Systems technology development, a comprehensive review of the literature of 
the vulnerabilities and threats to these systems and analysis of present security 
frameworks for IoT.  The study also included real-world prototype testing and an analysis 
approach as a sub-method of the systems development research methodology, this 
approach identified threats, vulnerabilities and needed requirements for improved 
security of M2M devices. The approach led to the development of the final security 
framework that foundationally focuses on the device’s required functions versus actual 
capabilities of the devices tested and benchmarked within the tested ecosystem.          
 The literature review and data analysis results enabled the discovery of and 
provided gained knowledge to draw specific conclusions and directed the development of 
the improved security framework.  The final framework can be replicated and used by 
M2M device manufactures, IoT systems developers and security architects for guidance 
in securing the overall IoT ecosystem and the M2M devices. Chapter 5 presents 
conclusions, implications, and recommendations for future research and concludes with a 
summary of the research study. 
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Conclusions 
 The following conclusions are drawn from the review of the literature and the 
appropriate results from the systems analysis. Table 2 represents the theoretical model on 
present risks believed to threaten the IoT ecosystem, followed by a short description of 
the major categories as described by the OWASP Internet of Things Top 10 Risks (2014).  
 
Table 2. IoT Theoretical Top 10 Risks 
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 The above model identifies risks associated across the IoT ecosystems domains. 
Table 3 below offers an improved model of the Top 5 risks that threaten the M2M 
devices that will operate within the IoT.  This model is functional and is formulated from 
real-world testing and drawn by content from Chapter 3 and results from Chapter 4.  
 
Table 3. Top 5 Functional Risks and Vulnerabilities  
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Table 3 categorizes the five high-level risk domains related to M2M devices and 
identifies weakness from the M2M device’s perspective.  This model provides a checklist 
of concepts that leads to stronger protections for the M2M devices and processes. 
Highlighted are five key categories where technical vulnerabilities have been found and 
observed during the prototyping phase.   
These categories include: 
 The “Communications Network Risks” showing that M2M devices are highly 
vulnerable to legacy wireless network attacks.  M2M devices must be capable of 
gathering information and delivering that information reliably and securely (Bartoli et al., 
2011).  The present protocol suite exhibits vulnerabilities that hinder performance, and 
network reliability, these vulnerabilities include the weakness of the transport layer and 
include, RF jamming and eavesdropping attacks.  M2M devices are vulnerable to many 
of the same “Applications Risks” that threaten Mobile and Smartphone devices.  
However, the IoT architecture is dependent on many technologies from different 
domains, this makes the M2M devices less secure because of lacking identification, 
authentication and authorization for interoperability across capillary networks within the 
domains.  Present technologies do not scale across federated networks and various IoT 
ecosystems because of lacking standardization efforts and reliable system interfaces (Wu, 
et al., 2011). 
 Some M2M devices are designed to perform solo to limited tasks making the 
devices vulnerable to “Devices Limitations Risks”.  These risks include low and limited 
data storage capabilities, low processing ability, limited availability of power resources 
and little situational recognition.   However, these vulnerabilities also exist between 
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devices and gateways in capillary networks where many devices may communicate with 
each other proving again that lacking interoperability and management capabilities, leads 
to even greater limitations and risk.  The very nature of the physical environment that 
many M2M devices are deployed within causes a significant threat to the device because 
harsh conditions lead to worsening resources, new failing points and attack vectors.  Plus, 
protocols for cryptanalysis and API protections in IoT are not strong enough and 
efficiently tested from the device side (Hue, et al., 2013).  
 M2M devices lack strong “control” mechanisms and attacks may lead to the 
malicious takeover of the physical device.  These include messaging manipulation from 
untrusted inputs and unauthorized access from secure session management.  Lack of 
well-defended requirements and standards solutions cause an unsuitable system design 
and management solution (Foschini, Taleb, Corradi, & Bottazzi, 2011). 
 The reached goal of this research was to create a better security framework for 
M2M device security development. Chapters 3 and 4 provide an outline for framework 
development.  The framework illustrated in Figure 3 is created from multiple 
perspectives included in the system development process.  This approach provided a 
means for developing and applying a security design method for M2M devices by 
applying the System Development Methodology.  For this research, a mollified 3-phase 
approach was applied.  Phase 1 conducted a preliminary analysis and foundation 
knowledge gathering, Phase 2 conducted the system analysis for developing stronger 
security requirements recommendations and, Phase 3 developed the new framework.  The 
framework uses “prototyped” observed results supported by results extracted from 
literature review to identify vulnerabilities and strengthen the device specifications and 
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then provided a formal representation of specifications and requirements in the form of 
the illustrated frameworks (Figure 2, Table 3, and Figure 3). 
 The basic building blocks of this framework are the “use cases” as defined in 
Chapter 2.  For this research the “use cases” can be thought of as both the “actor” and 
“role” in the development process.  From the “use cases”, partial knowledge is gained 
about the role that the M2M device must fulfill.  Additional knowledge in gained from 
calculating the “Business Logic” that must be performed by the M2M Device.  The 
“Business Logic” serves as the “perspective” of the actor.  Once the knowledge gained 
stage is completed and combined, the first “action” is determined and the function of the 
M2M device was determined.  In this framework, the “action” determines the “Functional 
Classification” of the device role (Godfrey et al., 2015).  These steps complete Phase 1 of 
the System Development Methodology.   
 In Phase 2 the present frameworks were analyzed, problems found and improved 
requirements then defined.  For this research, the present framework for M2M security 
that was interpreted and analyzed was the OWASP Internet of Things Top 10 (2014).  
The test scenarios for diagnosing problems with present technologies were then realized 
and recommend requirements generated using the prototyping development approach.  
Prototyping is an experimental process that is suitable for both gaining present systems 
operational experience and for the discovery of new requirements identification 
(Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2015).  
 Phase 3 includes the design and development of the final framework.  The 
research completed the development and documentation of the system by preparing a 
framework that contributes to the overall solution of security for next-generation devices.  
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The framework presented in Figure 3 contributes the missing knowledge needed to fill 
the gap between the intersection of human interface, wireless, and M2M device risks and 
security countermeasures (Riahi, et al., 2014).  The framework solves the stated problem 
by developing and focusing on devices “functions and capabilities”, this effort (a) 
adequately considers restrictions and constraints; (b) identifies significant shortfalls; and 
(c) led to a more thorough and detailed M2M security framework.   
 
 
Figure 3. Final Functional Framework 
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Implications 
 Figure 3, shown above, illustrates the improved framework.  This study helped 
identify the present vulnerabilities in M2M devices and assist in the development of new 
security requirements for the IoT ecosystem.  The results of the study and the review of 
the literature guided the design of the new security framework for M2M devices.  This 
new framework provides needed direction and exposes threats that must be taken into 
consideration for secure device development and ecosystem implementation.  
 This study also contributed to the body of knowledge of systems design by 
applying the development research method to address the research problem of proper 
functional security in next generation technologies.  Although the research was focused 
on the method of development and the creation of a security framework, an additional 
goal was reached of discovering, restructuring and presenting the M2M device top five 
risks and threats framework.  
 
Recommendations 
 Future research could be conducted based on the results outlined in Chapter 4 of 
this study, many of the tests proved the feasibility of attack.  Results found that many of 
the vulnerabilities are caused by past technology vulnerabilities and known threats. 
Present communications protocols that will be implemented in future IoT ecosystems are 
flawed with both security and privacy concerns.  The possible development and 
redesigned or even better, new communications protocols, will prove to have value to the 
industry.  This study also focused on the development of a new framework or risk and 
research could be conducted on specific vulnerabilities and development of 
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countermeasures address exposed risk.  Such research would provide deeper discovery 
and furnish needed requirements for device hardware and software design.   
 
Summary 
 At present, there are many security problems with IoT ecosystems and, in 
particular, the M2M devices that are designed for these systems (Lai et al., 2012).  This 
research fills the gap that exists between the past approaches for security framework 
development and understanding, by identifying how these new technologies must differ 
from past and present technologies.  The past techniques for developing security 
requirements do not adequately consider the use of new technologies, which weakens 
countermeasure implementations.  Developed by this research is a security framework 
designed for requirements development.  This research provides a framework design 
method for identifying next-generation security concerns and processes for comparing, 
contrasting and evaluating non-human device security protections used in the IoT 
ecosystem.    
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Appendix A:  Real-World Test 
Appendix A 
Real-World Test 
 
The below tables outline the test that were executed to verify device compliance, 
function, and capability as required by the defined Use Cases. The results then were used 
to build the Risk, Vulnerability and Functional Security Design Framework. 
Test 1 Baseline vulnerability scans are directed towards Weak Server Side 
Controls.   
What Is 
Tested and 
Analyzed? 
Literature explains that vulnerability scans identify open ports. Also 
reported is the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, the device operating 
system, software and services that are running on the device.  
Overview The vulnerability scanner used for testing was a software-based scanner. 
Issue Devices are vulnerable to application failures and open communication 
ports that lead to DoS attacks. Scanning for known vulnerabilities 
allowed for the discovery of access opportunities.  
Description We executed scanning to find vulnerable access points on various 
devices running on an isolated network.  
Impacted Use 
Cases 
All 
Affected 
Security 
Domain 
Integrity, confidentiality, availability, access control, communication 
channels, network attacks, application security, application environment 
and security controls, encryption concepts, capabilities of information 
systems, resource protection, incident response, patch and vulnerability 
management, disaster recovery process, and internal security (CISSP, 
2014). 
Affected 
Stakeholders 
Application service providers, manufacturers of devices, the M2M 
device/gateway, management providers, M2M service providers, 
network operators, and user/consumers. 
Architecture 
Impact 
We found that this test impacts the device communication protocols 
within the service-layer and the storage of encryption keys for 
authentication. Also found was that the wireless network and 
configuration settings are impacted if vulnerabilities are discovered 
because the privacy and security of messaging is at risk. 
Action For the purpose of this research the vulnerability scanner was 
considered the server. As the server, the scanner was used to send and 
scan the device. In particular to this research the events of interest were 
host discovery, port scanning, OS detection and service discovery.  
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Expected 
Result 
We expected that the standard behavior for each of the events would be 
capable of being identified on each device.  
Actual Result We found that normal various TCP and UDP ports were opened on the 
M2M type devices as well as the other network connected devices.  
Knowledge 
Gained 
We gained knowledge that because the devices are prototyped the ports 
can be turned off or on. However, for the device to communicate 
applications such as for SMS messaging must remain opened and did 
leave ports vulnerable to various known SMS attacks. However, being 
able to scan a device is not a bad thing. Discovering vulnerabilities or 
configuration errors results in understanding where intrusions can occur 
and leads to the development of better countermeasures.  
New 
Requirement. 
 
A better-designed device allows for the scanning and review of process. 
Quarantining the devices applications and revoking the permissions for 
the applications closes the exposed ports. Only ports that are required 
for data transfer are exposed. Over the cellular network, updating the 
device communications module to 3G and placing a 3G or above smart 
card into the devices increases security and strengthens protection 
against server side control attacks.  
 
 Service-Layer Keys 
 
Test 2 We directed Test 2 towards insufficient transport layer protection and 
improper session handling.  
What Is Tested 
and Analyzed? 
We tested the availability of long-term service-layer keys and the 
storage of keys on the devices as called for by (oneM2M Partners, 
2014).  
Overview The services layer consists of all the services that the manufacturer 
makes available on the devices or is preinstalled by device peripherals. 
The long-term service-layer consists of keys that may be discovered 
while they are stored on the devices. If discovered, these keys may be 
copied and used against the device or gateway during other attacks 
(Ukil, Bandyopadhyay, Bhattacharyya, & Pal, 2013).  
Issue The services layer is highly vulnerable to attack because the data within 
the layers provides the business functionality that allows the devices’ 
supported communications and messaging to and from the gateway. If 
copied, the long-term service-layer keys may be used to impersonate 
M2M devices to the gateways or vice versa (Latvakoski et al., 2009).  
Description When “long-term service-layer keys are stored within the M2M device 
or M2M gateways”, they may be discovered during scanning by 
unauthorized entities (oneM2M, 2014). For example, transport layer 
security (TLS) uses a cryptographic system with two keys to encrypt 
data (Hersent, Boswarthick, & Elloumi, 2011). Once the keys are 
discovered, they can be used for illegitimate purposes, such as false 
authorization and authentication. There are various methods for 
discovering open and available keys. Hardware probing methods include 
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the monitoring of internal processes or simply the reading of memory 
contents. According to Lu, O’Neill, and McCanny (2010), DPA is a 
widely studied side-channel attack however this attack is outside the 
scope of this research. They recommend that Random Delay Insertion 
(RDI) be deployed as a countermeasure technique. However, M2M 
devices run weak cryptographic processes and do not have the resources 
for increased countermeasures that will reduce the risk of DPA attacks.  
Impacted Use 
Cases 
All 
Affected 
Security Domain 
Integrity, confidentiality, availability, access control, communication 
channels, network attacks, application security, application environment 
and security controls, encryption concepts, capabilities of information 
systems, resource protection, incident response, patch and vulnerability 
management, disaster recovery process, and internal security (CISSP, 
2014) 
Affected 
Stakeholders 
Application service providers, manufacturer of devices, M2M 
device/gateway, management providers, M2M service providers, 
network operators, and user/consumer  
Architecture 
Impact 
We found that this test impacts the device communication protocols 
within the service-layer and the storage of encryption keys for 
authentication. The wireless network and configuration settings are 
impacted if vulnerabilities are found, because the privacy and security of 
messaging is at risk.   
Action 1. Use the V scan to discover IP address.  
2. Ping open ports, this test’s the security of the communication 
protocols     
3. Establish a wireless connection with which to send input data 
and functions toward the device by using ARPping and verify 
working device.  
4. Scan again with Nmap to see the device using Wi-Fi Internet 
connection  
5. Observe the tool log for data computation bugs.  
6. Document the device performance and responses from the 
device.  
7. Report any failures or open known vulnerabilities that effect 
policy and enforcement. 
Expected Result This is a deep analysis of the ports open on a running device. The test 
exposes the device to authorization vulnerabilities. We expected that the 
tools would report no known security vulnerabilities against the open 
ports. These devices run limited applications such as GPS location 
tracking, which only requests location data when needed. There are 
inherent limitations to resources on these devices; data should be stored 
read-only and limited in storage time.   
Actual Result We found that because these devices are prototyped devices and are 
built using the Raspberry Pi version 2. These are unsecure devices. 
Testing layer 2 with port pinging and scanning showed open ports and 
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device information including the TCP IP Address and MAC.  
Knowledge 
Gained 
The ARP request determined that the host is alive, also the MAC 
address of the devices is returned. However the RPi are low processing 
devices and repeated testing freezes the device and takes it off network. 
Also ICMP echo request using Scapy flood the device at whatever port 
is specified in the ping command. This flood message stresses the CPU 
to MAX usage.   
New 
Requirement. 
 
Detailed in Chapter 4. 
 
Stored Management and Control Frames 
Test 3 Test 3 was directed towards Network Layer Protection and Insecure 
Data Storage.  
What Is 
Tested and 
Analyzed? 
The importance of deleting stored management and control frames on 
Layer 2 of M2M devices, as described by Hersent, Boswarthick, and 
Elloumi (2011) 
Overview Management and control frames are directly related to service-layer 
keys and focused on the Layer 3 frames because M2M data will service 
three requirements: massive data analysis, real-time data analysis, and 
deep data analysis (Kitagami, Yamamoto, Koizumi, & Suganuma, 
2013). In many cases, open source software such as SQLite and R will 
be used to pass data in small- and medium-sized M2M service systems. 
Information stored in the devices can be detected and used by an 
attacker to compromise these systems. The device is also at risk for 
being spoofed or turned into an attacking device, a fake access point, or 
a fake wireless bridge.  Management and control frames must be 
protected to protect the protocol stack (Lin, 2008). 
Issue Literature explains that unprotected protocol stacks may lead to denial 
of service (DoS), Man-in-the-middle (MinM), and similar attacks. This 
vulnerability can prevent the operation of the overall M2M service. 
Description Test the possibility of locating service-layer keys within the protocol 
stack and the device. We tried to discover if these keys could be reused, 
deleted, or changed. All systems have management commands that can 
be used and attack vectors that can perpetrate key-storage functions of 
M2M devices and M2M gateways. 
Impacted Use 
Cases 
All  
Affected 
Security 
Domain 
Authentication, application security, and network security 
Affected 
Stakeholders 
Application service providers, manufacturer of devices and gateways, 
service providers, network operator, and user/consumer 
Architecture If long-term keys that are transferred over the service-layer experience 
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Impact compromise of storage, this impacts the constraints on the device.  
Action 1. Used ping tools to ping and to send ICMP echo request   
2. This should indicate that the host corresponding to the 
address is alive 
3. Generate the test inputs. These are random messages with 
test strings of characters.  
4. Send various messages to the device over the air using both 
the GSM/GPRS and Wi-Fi networks 
5. Test the Protocols IP, ICMP, ARP, & RIP and uses Routers 
as its device flood test the ICMP against the device not router 
6. Using hping3 to perform layer 3 discovery 
7. Use Scapy to discover layer 4 User Datagram Protocol 
(UDP) or Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) transport 
protocols 
8. Document the error logs from the control center and “real” 
errors that relate to device management and architectural 
controls.  
Expected 
Result 
We expected to discover that the authentication frames and open data 
transfer may be used for Layer 3 attacks such as DoS and Man-in-the-
Middle attacks. These tests should find a weakness in the various 
protocols. There are known vulnerabilities in the GSM stack. It is 
expected that sending different configuration messages to the device on 
each port will expose the GSM vulnerabilities.   
Actual Result We found that running hping3 does successfully scan layer 3 and layer 4 
and reports the device IP.  Using Scapy to perform layer 4 discovery 
reported that the host is alive. However, only open and not closed TCP 
ports reported an ACK to messaging.  
Knowledge 
Gained 
The Scapy test fails/locks all 3 RPi devices when a particular port is 
addressed in the execution string.     
New 
Requirement. 
 
Detailed in Chapter 4. 
 
 
Software-to-Hardware Signal Interface 
Test 4 We directed Test 4 towards unintended data leakage and improper 
session handling. 
What Is 
Tested and 
Analyzed? 
M2M device software-to-hardware signal interface (Bernardi, 
Merseguer, & Petriu, 2013). 
Overview Many M2M devices run a small version of Linux as an operating 
system. Components such as cameras and Wi-Fi nodes are run and 
accessed through files that are usually located in the /dev directory of 
the OS. These files communicate directly with the kernel driver that is 
in current communication with the component hardware.  All 
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components must communicate transparently, regardless of their 
hardware and software (Bernardi, Merseguer, & Petriu, 2013). 
Issue Literature review explains that these files are easy to expose and, once 
found, can lead to vulnerability (Igure, Laughter, & Williams, 2006). 
Description We note that M2M devices’ use open standards that are tested for 
transparency. The use of open standard makes the device vulnerable to 
attackers. Because these devices are usually built from commercial off-
the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software, attackers seek knowledge to 
expose open vulnerabilities so that they can disable the fail-safe 
mechanisms (Igure, Laughter, & Williams, 2006). 
Impacted Use 
Cases 
All 
Affected 
Security 
Domain 
Integrity, confidentiality, availability, access control, communication 
channels, network attacks, application security, disaster recovery 
process, and internal security (CISSP, 2014) 
Affected 
Stakeholders 
Service provider, manufacturer, device management system, network 
operator, and user/consumer 
Architecture 
Impact 
The critical infrastructure includes Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) networks like natural disaster early warning 
systems and crime prevention cameras. A range of vulnerabilities 
threatens them: from equipment failures to terrorist attacks (Igure, 
Laughter, & Williams, 2006). 
Action 1. First discover the OS using Nmap 
2. Test input, output, and measurement data considerations. 
3. Use p0f to analyze a Wireshark capture file. 
4. Identify input devices with ranges and resolutions of values. 
5. Identify output devices with ranges and resolutions of values. 
6. Define the full range of input disturbances (unexpected 
system inputs).  
7. Send messages Nmap to the device input ports to discover 
Service fingerprinting.   
8. Observe possible output disturbances that occur when 
unexpected system inputs are received. 
9. Review and analyze device performance.  
10. Read the error log from the control center and document 
errors. 
Expected 
Result 
We expected that the OS is reported correctly and all device port that 
are open and closed are disclosed. As environmental conditions change, 
the RF signal, in or out data, and messaging should all continue to 
match a specified value as described by the standards.  
Actual Result We found that the tests run successfully over Wi-Fi and GPRS showed 
the required and needed information for ensure a successful penetration 
test.  
Knowledge 
Gained 
We gain the knowledge that from the reported IP addresses, active 
machines, and open ports are identified from the target devices.  The 
services running on specific ports do ensure successfully routing. Using 
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the open source threat assessment tool the complexity and severity of a 
single point of failure of the device can be identified as explained by 
Igure, Laughter, and Williams, (2006).  
New 
Requirement. 
 
Detailed in Chapter 4. 
 
Interface Attack  
Test 5 We directed Test 5 towards the security decisions via untrusted inputs 
and insecure data storage.  
What Is 
Tested and 
Analyzed? 
We looked for the discovery of human user interface attack and 
tampering resistance notification as described by Hagar (2013).  
Overview Literature explains that the M2M systems are designed to function 
without human interaction. However, M2M message traffic, data 
transfer, and content are influenced by human-based traffic, such as 
location data, billing data, and personalized content. The M2M device 
must also be monitored, repaired, and managed by humans (Cha, Shah, 
Schmidt, Leicher, & Meyerstein, 2009).  
Issue We understood that M2M devices may be targets of tampering, 
repurposing, or modification. There is a need for failure indicators, such 
as on/off settings, hardware status, and network control or alarms. These 
false indicators will cause an operator to take action on this information. 
If such an attack takes place, an attacker can then perform remote 
hacking on management or maintenance interfaces and fully 
compromise the device and platform. 
Description Test the ability to discover tampering and flaws in the monitoring 
system that could lead to vulnerabilities in the device-user interaction.  
Impacted Use 
Cases 
All 
Affected 
Security 
Domain 
Access control, application security, and device security and control 
platform  
Affected 
Stakeholders 
Application service provider, manufacturer, service provider, system 
administrator, network operator, and user/consumer 
Architecture 
Impact 
M2M service infrastructure and device  
Action 1. Use the Control Center to apply inputs and verify that the 
devices is connected correctly.  
2. Make error messages that inform the human user of an alarm. 
3. Identify hosts that are discovered by UDP probes 
4. This sets up a place to insert overflow input to the buffers 
when with false messages by sending messages from the 
control center to the device. 
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5.  Define the inputs that create these outputs.  
6. Test these input/output combinations.  
7. Determine what the outputs are and then attempt to force 
invalid human interaction.   
 
Expected 
Result 
We expected that the UDP port that is open will be discovered.  
 
Actual Result We found that the port reported open is 2165. Running amap identifies 
that only port 22 is open until closed.  
Knowledge 
Gained 
We gained knowledge that it is very easy to identify hosts using 
discovery against UDP and probing an isolated task. Hping3 uses ICMP 
host unreachable responses to identify live hosts with UDP requests.  
An additional scan using Nmap report all open ports. This discovery 
allows for fingerprinting of services. Testing discover that port 22 
(SSH)  is opened on the device but the other ports are closed. SSH is 
opened at install of the OS and not closed at reboot.  
New 
Requirement. 
 
Detailed in Chapter 4. 
 
Unrestricted File Upload/Download 
Test 6 We directed Test 6 towards improper session handling and unrestricted 
file upload/download.  
What Is 
Tested and 
Analyzed? 
Unrestricted file upload to M2M infrastructure from the device 
equipment (Flick & Morehouse, 2010; Skianis, 2013).  
 
Overview Literature explains that the vulnerability affects databases, operating 
systems, and applications that are developed for internal use and in 
M2M devices that are connected to the Internet with unrestricted access. 
These platforms lack restrictions on the size or number of uploaded 
files. Files that are too large will consume resources and freeze the 
device operations (Flick & Morehouse, 2010).  When open access to 
SSH of FTP servers and found device data storage is at risk.  
Issue We understand that when an attacker uploads or transfers files of 
dangerous types using an automated processed within the M2M 
ecosystem via open FTP ports this allows device compromise.   
Description We explains that attacker may use a compromised device to upload or 
transfer dangerous type files that can be used to hurt the ecosystem.  
Impacted Use 
Cases 
All 
Affected 
Security 
Domain 
Access control, communication channels, network attacks, application 
security, application environment and security controls, encryption 
concepts, and capabilities of information systems (CISSP, 2014)  
Affected Application service provider, manufacturer of device, network service 
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Stakeholders provider, system administrator, network operator, and user/consumer 
Architecture 
Impact 
M2M service infrastructure 
Action 1. Validate vulnerabilities using HTTP interaction 
2. Create an “input file” to send and retrieve from the device.  
3. Observe the network with scanner tools like “Wireshark”. 
4. Send data file from control server to the device.  
5. Validate vulnerabilities with HTTP interaction 
6. Review and closely analyze the results, looking for obvious 
crashes. 
 
Expected 
Result 
We expected that the FTP server will block the “input file”.  
Actual Result Described in Chapter 4.  
 
Knowledge 
Gained 
Detailed in Chapter 4. 
New 
Requirement. 
Offered in Chapter. 4 & 5.  
 
Discovery of Sensitive Data 
Test 7 We directed Test 7 towards broken cryptography and lack of binary 
protections.  
What Is 
Tested and 
Analyzed? 
The “discovery of sensitive data in M2M devices or M2M gateways” 
according to (Pandey, Choi, Kim, & Hong, 2011; oneM2M, 2014).  
 
Overview M2M devices, such as sensors, collect data that is sensitive, including 
toxic levels of poison, temperature of machinery, and personal 
consumer data.  The execution of sensitive functions and the storage and 
transfer of this information must be protected.  
Issue According to Pandey, Choi, Kim, and Hong (2011), M2M has important 
characteristics that other ecosystems do not. For example, M2M offers 
sleeping devices, low power devices, weak signal networks, and low 
device intelligence. Automated service discovery and an environment 
for the automatic execution of software and storage of sensitive data 
leads to a higher level of compromise potential (Cha et al., 2009).  
Description Literature explains that the level of encryption on all communication 
between the device and server is vulnerable by attacking the execution 
of sensitive functions within the M2M device. Verify the exposed 
sensitive data and ensure that protection is in place to prevent 
unauthorized entities from using this data for illegitimate purposes.  
Impacted Use 
Cases 
All 
Affected Integrity, confidentiality, availability, access control, communication 
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Security 
Domain 
channels, application security, application environment and security 
controls, encryption concepts, capabilities of information systems, 
resource protection, incident response, and internal security (CISSP, 
2014) 
Affected 
Stakeholders 
Application service provider, manufacturer of devices, network 
operator, and user/consumer 
Architecture 
Impact 
The device storage capability for sensitive data and the functions used 
by the device to send this data to nodes and gateways  
Action 1. Examine target device sensitive information using device 
forensic tools such as the Oxygen Forensic Tool Kit.  
2. Use the tools to communicate with the device remotely.  
3. Perform intensive caches analysis.  
4. Browse the cache and retrieve all information.  
5. From the network side, place a sniffer into the 
communication path between the device and server. 
6. Use open source tools to explore the SSL, SSH, and SCP 
type protocol.  These tools detect and sniff information from 
the network. 
7. Review the targeted application-received information from 
the server, such as dynamic updates, applets, and scripts. 
8. Verify that sensitive information is encrypted and protected.   
                      
Expected 
Result 
We expected to find that it is possible to capture sensitive information 
that is outbound and sent to the device. However, the data itself was be 
protected by the protocol security policy.  
Actual Result Detailed in Chapter 4.  
 
Knowledge 
Gained 
Explained in Chapter 4. 
New 
Requirement. 
 
Offered in Chapter 4. 
 
Eavesdropping 
Test 8 We directed test 8 towards poor authorization and authentication and 
broken cryptography.  
What Is 
Tested?  
Eavesdropping on M2M device service-communications protocols that 
connect the device to the gateway (Kylanpaa, Rantala, Merilinna, & 
Nieminen, 2013)  
Overview According Ren, Yu, Ma, and Ren (2013), all real-time, wireless 
communication-oriented overlay networks, like M2M based capillary 
systems, might operate within a registration based versus location 
lookup quire architecture.  This architecture has special security 
requirements because vulnerabilities may result in a breach of security 
110 
 
 
from real-time eavesdropping on messaging and data transfer. 
Issue Literature explains that eavesdropping of cryptographic resources 
discloses identities and exposes knowledge of sensitive information.  
Description We examined the feasibility of “eavesdropping on M2M Service Layer” 
(oneM2M, 2014).  Expose messages between components and the 
available cryptographic resources must protect confidential or private 
information.  
Impacted Use 
Cases 
All 
Affected 
Security 
Domain 
Integrity, confidentiality, availability, access control, communication 
channels, network attacks, and application security (CISSP, 2014) 
Affected 
Stakeholders 
M2M service provider, devices manufacturer M2M device/gateway 
management entities, network operator, and user/consumer 
Architecture 
Impact 
Radio network and device controls  
Action 1. Set up open source software (OpenBTS and FreeSWITCH) 
and the Ettus Transceiver to route voice and SMS traffic 
through a private GSM network. 
2. Hook up the Raspberry Pi to a radio interface for device 
testing. 
3. The Raspberry Pi runs: 
OpenBTS: GSM mobile phone standards network 
FreeSWITCH: call routing tool 
Python: for programming scripts 
4. Force device to attach to the GSM network. This takes 
advantage of weaknesses in the GSM protocol stack.  
5. Eavesdrop on the following devices: 
M2M devices to the M2M gateway 
M2M gateway to M2M devices 
6. Test the protection in communications protocols by sending 
authentication messages.  
7. Take advantage of weaknesses in the GSM protocol by 
performing unexpected actions, such as sending false 
identity data. 
8. Manipulate messaging protocols. 
9. Look at logs to see if Detailed in Chapter 4 can read 
sensitive information or modify message content. 
 
Expected 
Result 
We expected that the network and device tasks would be separated from 
each other by various systems. There are known weakness in GSM that 
can be exploited. However, M2M devices and applications should have 
a separation of functions that prevent tasks from being hijacked, which 
would make them less vulnerable to eavesdropping as explained by 
3GPP (2002).  
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Actual Result We found that packets can be downloaded leading to the impersonation 
of a user this may be caused by the intruder sends signaling and/or user 
data to the network, as a fake network.  
Knowledge 
Gained 
We gained the understanding that the intruder may be able to eavesdrop 
on signaling and data connections associated with other users. 
However, this is possible over various radio technologies.  
New 
Requirement. 
 
Detailed in Chapter 4. 
 
Communication Protocols (Fuzzing) 
Test 9 We directed Test 9 towards transport layer protection, client side 
injection and security decisions via untrusted inputs.  
What Is 
Tested and 
Analyzed? 
Alteration of M2M communication protocols and messaging between 
devices and gateway, as described by Sheng, Yang, Yu, Vasilakos, 
McCann, and Leung (2013).  
Overview The M2M ecosystem has complex deployment characteristics. New 
approaches and standards are required for the system to meet security 
requirements due to the resource constraints of present networks. Any 
alteration or manipulation of the messaging protocol may lead to the 
readability of sensitive information or modification of message content 
(Chen & Ma, 2014). 
Issue According to Chen and Ma (2014), the different communication 
protocols presently in use within the wireless and wire-lined system will 
cause a protocol security gap.  This gap may potentially lead to a threat 
against the M2M ecosystem.  Protocol device attacks include Man-in-
the-Middle attacks and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, exploitation of 
network services weaknesses, and over-the-air management attacks.  
Description Explore the transaction layer and its protocols that handle message 
exchange between the devices and gateway by altering the M2M device 
and forcing the device off the core network.  
Impacted Use 
Cases 
All 
Affected 
Security 
Domain 
Availability, access control, communication channels, and network 
attacks (CISSP, 2014). 
Affected 
Stakeholders 
Management entities, service provider, network operator, and 
user/consumer 
Architecture 
Impact 
Radio network and device controls. 
Action 1. Set up open source software (OpenBTS and FreeSWITCH) 
and the Ettus Transceiver to route voice and SMS traffic 
through a private GSM network. 
2. Hook up the Raspberry Pi to a radio interface for device 
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testing 
3. The Raspberry Pi runs: 
OpenBTS: GSM mobile phone standards network 
FreeSWITCH: call routing tool 
Python: for programming scripts 
4. Force device to attach to GSM network. This takes advantage 
of weaknesses in the GSM protocol stack.  
5. Eavesdrop on the following:  
The M2M devices to the M2M gateway 
The M2M gateway to M2M devices 
6. Test the protections in the communication protocols by 
sending authentication messages.  
7. Take advantage of weaknesses in the GSM protocol by 
performing unexpected actions such as sending false identity. 
8. Manipulate messaging protocols to fake a known network to 
the device. 
9. Look at logs to see if Detailed in Chapter 4 can read sensitive 
information or modify message contents. 
 
Expected 
Result 
As we expected the device to gateway communications defaulted to the 
cellular 3G protocols and authentication method. This will protect 
against known 2G vulnerabilities. However, if the device can be forced 
back to 2G, then weakness-allowing manipulation of the interaction will 
be seen. 
Actual Result We found that the Scapy tool is able to scan the device for open ports 
and determined that potential target services like GPS/Location and 
control center communication ports are open.  
Knowledge 
Gained 
  Knowledge gained showed that tested devices with GSM/GPRS SIM do 
register with the OpenBTS tool and we verified that the devices are not 
resistant to GSM fuzzing. Sending test SMS message to device does not 
fail the communication module however a full suite of created test cases 
has not been applied for full fuzz testing.  
New 
Requirement. 
 
Detailed in Chapter 4. 
 
Replay Messaging (false Base Station) 
Test 10 We directed Test 10 towards Improper session handling and transport 
layer protection   
What Is 
Tested and 
Analyzed? 
Replay messaging between devices and gateways as described by 
(Latvakoski et al., 2014) 
Overview The user’s data, signaling data, and control data require security 
measures for correct transmission.  This data passes between the devices 
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and gateways through the physical layer or protocol layers. If the 
protocol is compromised, all services are affected.   
Issue Literature contributes that the replay attack occurs when an attacker can 
copy messages between devices and gateways and use them to defeat 
authentication. Replay attacks damage transaction information by 
allowing for the modification, insertion, or deletion of legitimate user 
data or signaling message structures.  
Description We tested the feasibility of capturing messages. In order to discover if 
there is a possibility of any tracking mechanisms that allow for the 
identity of deceptive or fraudulent message content.    
Impacted Use 
Cases 
All 
Affected 
Security 
Domain 
Integrity, confidentiality, availability, access control, communication 
channels, and network attacks (CISSP, 2014) 
Affected 
Stakeholders 
Service provider and network operator 
Architecture 
Impact 
 Radio network and device controls 
Action 1. Set up open source software (OpenBTS and FreeSWITCH) 
and the Ettus Transceiver to route voice and SMS traffic 
through a private GSM network. 
2. Hook up the Raspberry Pi to a radio interface for device 
testing. 
3. The Raspberry Pi runs: 
OpenBTS: GSM mobile phone standards network 
FreeSWITCH: call routing tool 
Python: for programming scripts 
4. Force device to attach to the GSM network. This takes 
advantage of weaknesses in the GSM protocol stack.  
5. Eavesdrop on the following devices: 
M2M devices to the M2M gateway 
M2M gateway to M2M devices 
6. Test the protection in communications protocols by sending 
authentication messages.  
7. Take advantage of weaknesses in the GSM protocol by 
performing unexpected actions, such as send false identity 
data. 
8. Manipulate messaging protocols. 
9. Look at logs to see if Detailed in Chapter 4 can read sensitive 
information or modify message contents. 
10. Send back captured messages using Python script messages 
to change data content. 
11. Check the receipt of the repetition messages. 
12. Log the capability of attack.   
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Expected 
Result 
As we expected the attack may exploit the lack of protection in the 
communications service layers and that this lack will lead to replay or 
playback of network data transmissions thus leading to a successful 
false bases attack over GSM.  
Actual Result The devices roam and register with false base station.  
Knowledge 
Gained 
We gained the knowledge that a compromised BTS can act as a repeater 
against the M2M devices. In repeater mode, the attack platform 
functions as a relay for requests to the legitimate network. These 
systems are located in between the network and the target user. Good 
service requests and/or paging messages for the target device are modify 
or ignore by the attacking system. In the security architecture of 3G 
there is no prevention mechanism against false BTS relaying messages 
the device is only seeking authentication.   
New 
Requirement. 
 
Detailed in Chapter 4. 
 
Unauthorized or Corrupted Applications 
Test 11 We directed Test 11 towards security decisions via untrusted inputs and 
lack of binary protections.  
What Is 
Tested and 
Analyzed? 
“Unauthorized or corrupted applications or software in M2M devices” 
as explained by (Ho, Jacobs, Meissner, Meyer, Monjas, & Segura, 
2013) 
Overview Software does not properly anticipate or handle exceptional conditions 
in a manner that is required to provide a safe exchange of information. It 
is important that applications authenticate successfully to establish 
secure channels (Jeon, Lee, Park, & Jeong, 2013). 
Issue Literature explains that it is unknown how to detect replay attacks or 
mutual cluster authentication within a federated M2M ecosystem. 
Unauthorized devices may run software that authorizes functions to 
create vulnerabilities that impersonate the network and device 
management platform (Liu, 2012).   
Description Furthermore, these test showed that the feasibility of an attacker to 
impersonate the network and device management platform by 
temporary failing the single input and output communication protocol. 
If successful, the attacker could fail the device by reporting fake device 
consumption, breaching privacy, or reporting confidential information, 
which would lead to the attacker’s control of remote management 
functions and systems.  
Impacted Use 
Cases 
All 
Affected 
Security 
Domain 
Integrity, confidentiality, availability, access control, application 
security, application environment and security controls, and internal 
security (CISSP, 2014) 
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Affected 
Stakeholders 
M2M application service provider, manufacturer of M2M devices 
and/or M2M gateways, M2M device/gateway management entities, 
M2M service provider, and user/consumer 
Architecture 
Impact 
 
M2M service provider’s domain, M2M devices, and M2M gateways 
Action 1. Set up open source software (OpenBTS and FreeSWITCH) 
and the Ettus Transceiver to route voice and SMS traffic 
through a private GSM network. 
2. Hook up the Raspberry Pi to a radio interface for device 
testing. 
3. The Raspberry Pi runs: 
OpenBTS: GSM mobile phone standards network 
FreeSWITCH: call routing tool 
Python: for programming scripts 
4. Force device to attach to GSM network. This takes advantage 
of weaknesses in the GSM protocol stack.  
5. Eavesdrop on the following devices: 
M2M devices to the M2M gateway 
M2M gateway to M2M devices 
6. Test the protection in communications protocols by sending 
authentication messages.  
7. Take advantage of weaknesses in the GSM protocol by 
performing unexpected actions, such as sending false identity 
data. 
8. Manipulate messaging protocols.  
9. Manipulate an authentication protocol. 
10. Seek older protocol vulnerabilities. 
11. Look at logs to see if Detailed in Chapter 4 can read sensitive 
information or modify message contents. 
12. Send back captured messages using Python script messages 
to change data content.  
13. Manipulate client-server interactions. 
14. Check the receipt of the repetition messages. 
15. Log the capability of attack.   
 
Expected 
Result 
We expected to find that the communications application running on the 
device utilized a secure protocol that does not have weaknesses, which 
allows for the manipulation of interaction between the device and the 
end gateway.  
Actual Result We found and proved that the packet switched protocols do have known 
weakness that will disturb M2M device in this environment. This could 
mean that in 2G/3G legacy cellular communications systems that the 
relationship between the HLR, VLR, AC and other databases and 
networks elements might provide increased vulnerability when dealing 
with a mix of domains and crossover protocols (Huber and Huber 
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2002).  
Knowledge 
Gained 
Knowledge gained included verification that the primary radio/antenna 
component on the GSM network is the Base Station Transceiver (BTS) 
allows for IMSI catching using a False Base Station Transceiver. The 
devices see this base station as a legitimate carrier’s network. This is 
because the BTS transmits at a higher power level then the legitimate 
BTS. Per specification and design, all Mobile Devices seek the “best” 
power received transmission, once found the device transmits its 
identifier data, such as IMSI. 
New 
Requirement. 
 
Detailed in Chapter 4. 
 
System Interdependencies 
Test 12  We directed Test 12 towards improper session handling insecure data 
storage and unintended data leakage.  
What Is 
Tested and 
Analyzed? 
M2M system interdependencies threats and cascading impacts 
(Macaulay & Singer, 2011)   
 
Overview Proper message content delivery affects the overall ecosystem 
environment and the information that a message contains includes all 
interdependencies.  Interdependencies are defined as types of 
intelligence that are actionable, such as asset ownership, location, and 
device role (Bianchi, 2014). 
Issue Literature explains that the underlying systems and resources may 
impose many forms of vulnerabilities on interdependency that directly 
relate to failures of the ecosystems’ critical infrastructures (oneM2M, 
2013) 
Description We gathered and tested the effects of external interdependencies on the 
M2M endpoints from the perspective of the device to the M2M 
gateway. For this research, an interdependencies threat is anything that 
can be used as an attack vector and shares resources.  
Impacted Use 
Cases 
All use cases 
Affected 
Security 
Domain 
Application environment and security controls, resource protection, 
incident response, patch and vulnerability management, and disaster 
recovery process (CISSP, 2014) 
Affected 
Stakeholders 
Device/gateway management entities and M2M service provider 
Architecture 
Impact 
Principle of least privilege, internal system, and control center  
Action 1. Load a malicious resource into the device.  
2. Use a bootstrap program to add a program, like J2EE 
applications, to simulate malware. 
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3. Verify the application is running and that other component 
based applications, such as GPS, are running correctly.  
4. Modify the path variable to read and write data to the same 
local file store as the component based applications.  
5. Include malicious resources that can be transmitted from the 
gateway and sent to the device.  
6. Observe whether commands can unwittingly be executed on 
the device by a remote message or sent application.  
Expected 
Result 
As we expected that the device’s operating system and that enforced the 
principle of least privilege all system dependencies are secured to the 
same or higher level of assurance as other programs.  
Actual Result Nothing found. 
 
Knowledge 
Gained 
We gained the knowledge that no privilege user information is on the 
device to manipulate the radio or device parameter outside of acceptable 
use. However the screen only shows MEID, IMEI, SIM ID and 
VERSION information but this should be acceptable for simple 
management.   
New 
Requirement. 
 
Detailed in Chapter 4. 
 
Context Awareness 
Test 13 We directed Test 13 towards lack of binary protections 
What Is 
Tested and 
Analyzed? 
M2M device application security with context awareness and the ability 
of the device to store relevant information, including the owner of the 
device, network authentication keys, and other specific access policies 
as described by (Cam-Winget & Didier, 2014) 
Overview Context-awareness aims to break applications (Hagar, 2013) such as 
device authentication and key generation.  
Issue Literature explains that there is a lack of context awareness with the 
M2M ecosystems and how they will function. Most M2M devices are 
being deployed as a “one size fits all” box that will function as a tool for 
other devices, gateways, and applications. This increases the risks 
associated with security.  
Description Apply deep packet inspection related to what has been completed on 
mobile smart devices. As more and more applications are developed in 
the M2M ecosystem, there is a need to consider the other attack 
possibilities, such as software test attacks, device-to-device attacks, and 
cognitive machines attacks. These attacks take advantage of weaknesses 
in the client-server relationship and various protocols that allow for 
device communications.  
Impacted Use 
Cases 
All use cases 
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Affected 
Security 
Domain 
Integrity, confidentiality, availability, access control, communication 
channels, network attacks, and application security (CISSP, 2014) 
Affected 
Stakeholders 
Application service provider 
Architecture 
Impact 
M2M service provider's domain, M2M devices, and M2M gateways 
Action 1. Gather and list the functions and links between applications 
and communications protocols.   
2. List and map all application tasks and functions.   
3. Identify use scenario as based on Use Case requirements.  
4. Note the different user types as well as common and 
uncommon usages of running applications.  
5. Define valid data or input for application and data 
transmitted.  
6. Define any invalid or valid data as well as input options for 
each application.  
7. Build a matrix of invalid data inputs and outputs, including 
specific data points or values that are common and different.  
8. Determine what inputs and outputs expose failures. 
9. Test the end-to-end functional tests of the application. 
10. Test the app against expected functionality. 
11. Compare the results against standard requirements.  
12. Identify risk of failure based on Use Cases.   
Expected 
Result 
As we expected all the running applications used for external 
communications to a network did function and fail as defined. For 
example, it should not be possible for the authentication protocol to be 
manipulated or for the messaging protocols to be spoofed by an 
application or other clients or servers.  
Actual Result However, actual results showed that applications do close unexpectedly 
and fail the devices. 
Knowledge 
Gained 
We gained knowledge that when handling exceptions, an application 
should provide an error message.  
New 
Requirement. 
 
The device should present a message that is relevant to the context of 
the application failure. 
 
 
 
Man in the Middle 
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Test 14 We directed Test 14 towards poor authorization and authentication. 
What Is 
Tested and 
Analyzed? 
The possibility of Man-in-the-Middle attack (Kim, Jeong, & Hong, 
2013) 
Overview According to Kim, Jeong, and Hong (2013), it is difficult to detect or 
prevent the Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack in the M2M ecosystem. 
The problem is elevated due to the difficulties of managing or 
controlling each device independently within the system. 
Issue According to Jin (2013), M2M ecosystems lack proper device 
situational recognition within the systems that certifies the platform and 
message protections. Today, these systems use identity-based 
algorithms for situational recognition and a convergence framework to 
analyze certification technology that reply on keys and other sensitive 
information. In addition, MitM attacks target integrity and 
confidentiality from a messaging standpoint, which allows the attacker 
to take over as the Core Network by representing the gateway to the 
device.  
Description We executed a Man-in-the-Middle on the device by intruding into a 
controlled network. We tried to detect basic flaws by observing the 
device’s network traffic, protocol design and application, and the server 
configuration. The goal is to expose the lack of security protections of 
data in transit over the communication pipe by gaining unauthorized 
possession of the device.  
Impacted Use 
Cases 
All 
Affected 
Security 
Domain 
Integrity, confidentiality, availability, access control, communication 
channels, network attacks, and application security (CISSP, 2014) 
Affected 
Stakeholders 
Application service provider, M2M gateways, gateway management 
entities, network operator, and user/consumer 
 
Architecture 
Impact 
Radio network  
Action 1. Set up open source software (OpenBTS and FreeSWITCH) 
and the Ettus Transceiver to route voice and SMS traffic 
through a private GSM network. 
2. Hook up the Raspberry Pi to a radio interface for device 
testing. 
3. The Raspberry Pi runs: 
OpenBTS: GSM mobile phone standards network 
FreeSWITCH: call routing tool 
Python: for programming scripts 
4. Force device to attach to GSM network. This takes advantage 
of weaknesses in the GSM protocol stack.  
5. Eavesdrop on the following devices: 
M2M devices to the M2M gateway 
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M2M gateway to M2M devices 
6. Test the protection in communications protocols by sending 
authentication messages.  
7. Take advantage of weaknesses in the GSM protocol by 
performing unexpected actions, such as sending false identity 
data. 
8. Manipulate messaging protocols.  
9. Manipulate an authentication protocol. 
10. Seek older protocol vulnerabilities. 
11. Look at logs to see if Detailed in Chapter 4 can read sensitive 
information or modify message contents. 
12. Send back captured messages using Python script messages 
to change data content.  
13. Manipulate client-server interactions. 
14. Check the receipt of the repetition messages. 
15. Log the capability of attack.   
 
Expected 
Result 
As we expected we successfully caused the device to roam to a fake 
core network by impersonating a gateway that looks legitimate to the 
device (3GPP, 2002).  
Actual Result We found that known MITM attack vectors do capitalize on (i.e. AP or 
fake AP capability) and that the Proxy tool or sniffer is required to 
determine if vulnerable and OpenBTS roaming.  
Knowledge 
Gained 
We gained the understanding that the capability of an intruder to put 
itself in between the target user and is a genuine threat in M2M as 
described by past research. The ability to eavesdrop, modify, delete, re-
order, replay, and spoof signaling and user data messages is possible 
(Kim, Jeong, & Hong, 2013).  
New 
Requirement. 
 
Detailed in Chapter 4. 
 
Buffer Overflows 
Test 15 We directed Test 15 towards security decisions via untrusted inputs and 
lack of binary protections. 
What Is 
Tested and 
Analyzed? 
The difficulty of a buffer overflow condition as described by (Hagar, 
2013).  
Overview The application framework of all devices manages the functions that 
perform various tasks, like resource management and call 
management. When an erroneous condition, such as a buffer 
overflow, occurs, the device processing power is stressed beyond the 
boundaries of the store data buffer limits. This condition leads to extra 
data overwriting and failure of the device processor’s memory 
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locations, which causes the device to fail (Shewale, Patil, Deshmukh 
& Singh, 2014).  
 
Issue Literature states that buffer overflow condition attacks corrupt data, 
crash the programs, or cause the execution of malicious code.  
Description As we understand the description by Hagar (2013), we tried to cause a 
strange error messages by sending data and messages to various 
abbreviations of application program interfaces (APIs) of the devices.  
All APIs are designed to have length constraints for the utilization of 
storage, data locations, and code. These constraints define execution 
space.  We tried to find any vulnerabilities that enable the execution of 
applications without proper authentication by exploiting the buffers, 
requesting additional header handling, and overflowing the 
authentication handling of the device.  
Impacted Use 
Cases 
All 
Affected 
Security 
Domain 
Access control, application security, application environment, and 
security controls (CISSP, 2014) 
Affected 
Stakeholders 
Application service provider 
Architecture 
Impact 
 Application security framework 
Action 1. Start the wireless interface in monitor mode on the specific 
API channel or port. 
2. Test the injection capability of the wireless device by sending 
data to the API. 
3. Using open source injection tools such as airodump, aireplay, 
and aircrack, test and confirm the API can be injected prior to 
proceeding.  If it cannot be, change API ports.  
4. Use correct authentication credentials in the messages for 
baseline results.  
5. Use fake authentication credentials in the messages document 
results.  
6. In a requested replay mode, inject packets. 
7. Increase packet injection until device fails.  
8. Collect error messages.  
Expected 
Result 
We expected that the exploitation of buffer overflow vulnerabilities do 
at some point exposed vulnerabilities. What is important is at what point 
and the measurement of “ease of action” of the testing. It was also 
expected that the buffer overflow will happen at the point the message is 
received and the device tried to store the message.  
Actual Result We found that no buffer overflow was found or actually detected. 
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Knowledge 
Gained 
Knowledge gained concluded that there is a possibility that the 
communications module used has a limited buffer and the header size 
and bigger files will cause a buffer overflow.  
New 
Requirement. 
 
Limiting the buffer size and using a GET method with short answers for 
all request and using AT commands for HTTP communication might 
correct this vulnerability.  
 
False Data Injection 
Test 16 We directed Test 16 towards poor authorization and authentication, 
client side injection and security decisions via untrusted inputs.  
What Is 
Tested and 
Analyzed? 
The difficulty of false data injection as described (Lu, Lin, Zhu, Liang, 
& Shen, 2012) 
Overview According to Lu et al. (2012), networks and devices like M2M are 
seriously threatened by false data injection attacks.  These attacks 
threaten authentication if they discover the capability of bypassing 
administrative privileges, can discover and view sensitive information, 
and can alter contents in a database.  
Issue We found that the issue is that if the availability of data is compromised, 
the authentication processes may be defeated. In that case, all sensitive 
information on the device is at risk.  
Description We researched the extent to which one may use the remote command 
execution technique to send mass injections to a device by sending 
simple text-based attacks as an injection vector. The goal was to 
understand the risk associated with injection flaws sent to and from 
untrusted application and devices.  
Impacted Use 
Cases 
All 
Affected 
Security 
Domain 
Integrity, confidentiality, availability, access control, communication 
channels, network attacks, and application security (CISSP, 2014) 
Affected 
Stakeholders 
M2M application service provider, manufacturer of M2M devices 
and/or M2M gateways, M2M service provider, and user/consumer 
Architecture 
Impact 
CSE, Mca-reference point, and Mcc-reference point 
Action 1. Start the wireless interface in monitor mode on the specific 
wireless GSM channel.  
2. Use NowSMS as a tool to send a simple, text-based injection 
from the command line.  
3. Test the injection capability of the wireless device from the 
gateway.  
4. Use command line messaging to send fake authentication 
credentials.  
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5. Send simple, text-based syntax to the device interpreter. 
6. As an injection vector, use untrusted data to seek injection 
flaws.  
7. Collect all new unique errors from both Wireshark and 
NowSMS.  
8. Make various API requests in replay mode to insert injected 
packets within application.   
9. Collect results and evaluate risk.  
Expected 
Result 
We expected that injection attacks would be mitigated by simple 
authentication. However, it is unknown: a) if the small size, low power, 
and unattended operations make a false data injection a higher risk and 
b) what other attacks can be launched by a compromised M2M device.   
Actual Result We found that various forms of side-channel attacks can be tested 
against the devices.  
Knowledge 
Gained 
We gained knowledge that after running several Python script that 
should have cause fault injection they freeze the RPi CPU. The timing 
attack however is inclusive based on the how long the device takes to 
execute commands when the Fault Injection script is running.  
New 
Requirement. 
 
Detailed in Chapter 4. 
 
Session Management 
Test 17 We directed Test 17 towards poor authorization and authentication and 
improper session handling.  
What Is 
Tested and 
Analyzed? 
Tested is session management and broken authentication as described 
by (Lake, Milito, Morrow, & Vargheese, 2013)  
Overview According to Okugawa, Masutani, and Yoda (2005), M2M networks 
may be self-organizing and composed of scattered small mobile devices 
that require the survivability of simultaneous communicating endpoints.  
The identity of the device is a key to managing the moving part.  If the 
session management or authentication is broken, all ecosystem functions 
are at risk of attack (Lake, et al., 2013). 
Issue The issue is that vulnerabilities in session authentication protocols lead 
to integrity and privacy issues because of key exchange failures and 
setup integrity flaws.  These flaws fail at session shutdown and within 
authentication schemes such as logout, account update, and session 
timeout.  
Description We tested the device methods of ensuring key privacy and verified that 
exploitation is of at least average difficulty and that “leaks or flaws in 
the authentication or session management functions” can be addressed 
by verifying that there are no exposed accounts, passwords, or session 
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IDs as described by Lake, et al., (2013) and oneM2M, (2013; 2014). 
Impacted Use 
Cases 
All 
Affected 
Security 
Domain 
Integrity, availability, access control, communication channels, network 
attacks, encryption concepts, and resource protection (CISSP, 2014) 
 
Affected 
Stakeholders 
Manufacturer of M2M devices, M2M gateways, device/gateway 
management entities, M2M service provider, and user/consumer 
Architecture 
Impact 
Key management and protocol architecture  
Action 1. Using tools like Backtrack, target the device over an IP 
session.  
2. Monitor the wireless interface normal session.  
3. Capture the messaging traffic sent to the gateway.   
4. Intercept all data that can be used to execute the attack.  
5. Get the session ID.  
6. Inspect the logs for any session tokens. 
7. The device should be using an expiration timeout that can be 
located in the session token. Verify that the token is 
cryptographically protected from tampering. 
8. Using the injection test to confirm injection. 
Expected 
Result 
We expected that no data would be visible other than the authenticated 
data that should be visible on the device after the termination of the 
session.  The same results were expected on the gateway side after 
session termination, when all data is removed from the logs after an 
inactivity timeout, complete reboot.  
Actual Result We found that the man in the middle attacks and false base station 
proves vulnerability when using known network authentication.  
Knowledge 
Gained 
We gained the knowledge that the main function of the communication 
module is to authentication, send and receive data. As know the GSM 
software network comments show the same probable security functions 
for mobility and session management as commercial network, thus have 
the same vulnerabilities.  
New 
Requirement. 
 
Detailed in Chapter 4. 
 
Security Misconfiguration 
Test 18 We directed Test 18 towards security decisions via untrusted inputs, 
transport layer protection and improper session handling 
What Is 
Tested and 
Analyzed? 
The security misconfiguration results on the device as described by 
(Hongsong, Zhongchuan, & Dongyan, 2011). 
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Overview If a device’s security is misconfigured, then various events can take 
place that may hinder the device’s performance.  Distributed values and 
functions may be directly affected such as device health, remote control, 
management, and the embedded applications’ restrictive security model. 
M2M services have to support evolving requirements and dynamically 
involve activities such as unsigned applications permission, unprotected 
APIs, and non-protected registry keys (Drira, 2010).  
Issue We found that the issue is that misconfiguration attacks exploit 
configuration weaknesses that can fail account access protections, 
expose-patching flaws, compromise “unprotected files and directories, 
and grant unauthorized access to the device” (oneM2M, 2014). Most 
devices are provided “off-the-shelf” with unnecessary and unsafe 
features that are enabled by default, including backdoor accounts, 
special access mechanisms, and incorrect permissions.  
Description We researched the device security configuration by reviewing the 
unauthorized access to sensitive information security policies. Attempt 
to compromise the device and M2M System by gaining unauthorized 
access to or knowledge of device accounts, applications, and platform.  
Impacted Use 
Cases 
All 
Affected 
Security 
Domain 
Availability, access control, application environment and security 
controls, encryption concepts, capabilities of information systems, and 
patch and vulnerability management (CISSP, 2014) 
Affected 
Stakeholders 
M2M application service provider, device, and user/consumer 
Architecture 
Impact 
Security policies, including policy execution, default value protection, 
and application roles 
Action 1. Test the security policies framework. 
2. Research indicative security vulnerabilities from the outside 
in by examining application binaries for unprotected 
conditions.  
3. Test and verify that the device interface controls 
automatically logout of all sessions.  
4. Test session termination after a given amount of time without 
activity (session timeout).  
5. Document results.  
Expected 
Result 
We expected that the accessible device environments are easy to exploit, 
that all applications have permission to run, that based configuration 
files are not properly locked down, that clear text reveals username and 
password type data, and that database connection strings are set to 
default settings in configuration.   
Actual Result We found that because the devices are built prototypes, services and 
application can be turning off and on because the root logon/password is 
known. This might not be the situation on a commercial device.   
Knowledge 
Gained 
We gained knowledge that several design and development-related 
vulnerabilities can be found if services are on and not secure.  And that 
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the vulnerabilities of misconfiguration and administration errors, should 
show in the logs.  
New 
Requirement. 
 
Detailed in Chapter 4. 
 
Insecure Cryptographic Storage 
Test 19 We directed Test 19 towards broken cryptography. 
What Is 
Tested and 
Analyzed? 
The possibility of and damage from insecure cryptographic storage as 
described by (Hussen, 2013)  
 
 
Overview According to Hussen (2013), M2M devices lack secure authentication, 
session key exchange schemes, and adequate cryptographic storage for 
small packet transmission. M2M devices lack these because the devices 
have low power requirements, insufficient processing ability, and 
associated resource constraints.  
Issue We find that the issue is that M2M devices have weak cryptographic 
algorithms and lack the power to decipher cipher text, which is what 
makes cryptanalysis successful.  
Description We tested the ability and ease of finding keys, viewing clear text copies 
of data, and accessing channels automatically without decrypting data. 
We wanted to understand how the device is encrypting data, how it is 
generating and storing safe keys, and what algorithms are deployed for 
secure cryptographic storage.  
Impacted Use 
Cases 
All 
Affected 
Security 
Domain 
Integrity, confidentiality, availability, access control, communication 
channels, network attacks, application security, application environment 
and security controls, and encryption concepts (CISSP, 2014) 
Affected 
Stakeholders 
Service provider, network operator, and user/consumer 
Architecture 
Impact 
Cryptographic architectural framework  
Action 1. Use scanning suites and packet sniffers to analyze protocol 
messaging.  
2. Execute cryptanalysis on applications via error logs and on 
messages via scanner.  
3. Separate plaintexts from any cipher texts.  
4. Try to find the secret key and key storage area.  
5. Break down and distinguish each algorithm’s output.  
6. Test the functionality of equivalent algorithms for encryption 
and decryption.  
7. Review information from all error messages and other 
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descriptive messages. 
8. Observe message patterns.  
9. Perform formal analysis of protocols. 
10. Document the outcome and disclosure of all sensitive 
information.  
 
Expected 
Result 
We expected that cryptanalysis would prove the need for new methods 
to protect message context and secure plaintext data transport. The 
devices lack encryption algorithms that do not require key sizes, and 
these are important for keeping data confidential.     
Actual Result We found that due to the mobility characteristic of devices they run 
mobile application that carry the same vulnerabilities known to past 
researcher, requiring protection of the application, the user data and 
system data.  
Knowledge 
Gained  
The removable storage device is not secure.  
 
Invalid Input Data 
Test 20 We directed Test 20 towards security decisions via untrusted inputs. 
What Is 
Tested and 
Analyzed? 
The validation of input data as required to ensure content in order to 
provide proper applications security (Ellinas, Panayiotou, Kyriakides, & 
Polycarpou, 2015) 
Overview It is important that M2M devices and gateways have the functionality to 
detect and prevent unauthorized access to the ecosystem. In the case of 
ecosystem federation, there is the possibility to have non-existent 
communications security between devices, due to lack of requirements 
requiring protection with mutual authentication so add protections 
against invalid input data and strict parameters that outline qualifiers, 
range, and data fields is required.  
Issue We found the issue to be that the injection of specific exploits such as 
buffer overflows, SQL injections, and cross-site scripting will grant 
access to the device and gateway’s functionality and privilege 
escalation.  
Description We tested the ability of using invalid input data to gain control of the 
device. Analyze the difficulty to impose a Denial of Service, bypass 
authentication, and escalate privileges by accessing unintended 
functionality, executing remote code, and stealing data.  
Impacted Use 
Cases 
All 
Affected 
Security 
Domain 
Integrity, confidentiality, availability, access control, communication 
channels, network attacks, application security, application environment 
and security controls, encryption concepts, capabilities of information 
systems, resource protection, incident response, patch and vulnerability 
management, disaster recovery process, and internal security (CISSP, 
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2014) 
Affected 
Stakeholders 
M2M application service provider, user/consumer 
Architecture 
Impact 
Messaging architecture, security architecture 
Action 1. Use a remote access tool such as NowSMS.   
2. Validate input vulnerabilities by causing a device crash or 
DoS attack.  
3. Send an SMS message to the device with execution scripts 
that are embedded with other exaction code, such as 
“location request.”   
4. Note and verify that the device OS and application require 
sufficient privileges to execute a script.  
5. Note and verify that the applications are protected against 
malicious written scripts that include rogue strict type 
characters and lack encoding enforcement.  
6. Ensure that all message content is delivered to the device and 
then sanitized against unacceptable content specification. 
7. Perform input validation by reviewing all error logs.  
8. Perform output validation by reviewing all error logs.  
9. Verify that session tokens function correctly.   
10. Document that all privilege constraints are authorized and in 
policy.  
Expected 
Result 
As we expected the input data sets do at some point fail the device and 
that sending misleading data to the device might cause a DoS.  
Actual Result We found that sensitive data from applications such as passwords and 
account information can be stored on an external card without OS 
warning the user of this occurring, this should be protected or prohibited 
on commercial devices.  Also the investigation of AT COMMANDS 
used as invalid data should be further studied.   
Knowledge 
Gained 
Detailed in Chapter 4. 
 
New 
Requirement. 
 
Presented in Chapter 4. 
Note: For mitigation, stronger message authentication is required and 
lightweight encryption should be used to provide secrecy (Shah, Perrig, 
& Sinopoli, 2008; Awad, 2015). 
 
Cross Scripting 
Test 21 We directed Test 21 towards improper session handling, client side 
injection and transport layer protection.    
What Is 
Tested and 
Analyzed? 
Cross scripting towards a device as described by (Gyrard, Bonnet, & 
Boudaoud, 2014)  
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Overview The M2M ecosystem passes communications over various networks.  
The devices are capable of sending messages and data using protocols 
such as HTTP or SIP. Thus, cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks may 
target events and allow for code or data injection that disrupts the 
communication path of the device (Siewruk, Sredniawa, Grabowski, & 
Legierski, 2013).  
Issue Literature explains the issues as the feasibility to use forbidden 
commands to bypass filters on a device using alternate forms of 
messaging syntax, which will cause the device to fail when processing.  
Description We tested for protocol weaknesses by using a cross-site scripting 
process by executing arbitrary commands from SMS messages and AT 
Commands.  
Impacted Use 
Cases 
All 
Affected 
Security 
Domain 
Communication channels, network attacks, application security, 
application environment, and security controls (CISSP, 2014) 
Affected 
Stakeholders 
Service provider, M2M gateways, and user/consumer 
Architecture 
Impact 
Protocols and the method of implementations of applications.  
Action 1. Using browser technologies that allow client side scripting, 
create various file submissions that will be sent from the 
control center to the device.  
2. Design and utilize characters type changes, such as SMS 
messaging, to test coding security enforcement.  
3. Deliver to the device to prove that the present protocols are 
functioning correctly against acceptable content 
specification. 
4. Ensure that all content coming from the device uses the 
correct encoding for message reply. 
5. Document the application response and delivery for timing, 
structure, and content correctness.  
6. Using the control center device management tools, apply 
messaging filtering. 
7. Rerun messaging test.  
8. Perform input validation for all remote content that includes 
automated remote and user-generated content.  
9. Document the output validation for all content. 
Expected 
Result 
As expected we found that ability to bypass filters where “scripts” are 
executed is a prohibited functionality. All input from the server side do 
validate.  The data-input did not fail the device.  The device validation 
application did prevent and protect unauthorized input from infecting 
other on-board applications.   
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Actual Result We found that the detection of potential cross site scripting, verbose 
errors and forceful browsing are aspects and typically identified with 
automated tool, however not a good test against devices. .   
Knowledge 
Gained 
When looking at cross-site scripting (XSS) and how this attacks a web 
application with data send malicious code must be use. When testing 
this in the form of a browser side script, the flaws allow attacks to input 
data and the user may see the output if it is generated without validating, 
further testing and planning for this type of attacked is required for 
devices. But for M2M devices there is no end user to view the output.  
New 
Requirement 
Only specific types of data may be authorized to be sent to and from the 
M2M devices.  
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